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One year shy of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 1
the Justices issued another equality ruling that is likely to become a histori
cal landmark.2 In Lawrence v. Texas,3 the Court invalidated a state law that
criminalized same-sex sodomy. This article contrasts these historic rulings
along several dimensions, with the aim of shedding light on how Supreme
Court Justices decide cases and how Court decisions influence social reform
movements.
Part I j uxtaposes Brown and Lawrence to illustrate how judicial deci
sionmaking often involves an uneasy reconciliation of traditional legal
*

Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School (2005-06); James Monroe Distinguished Profes
sor of Law and Professor of History, University of Virginia. B.A., M.A. 1980, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1983, Stanford Law School; D.Phil. 1988, Oxford University. -Ed. I am grate
ful to Daryl Levinson, Liz Magill, Bill Rubenstein, Jim Ryan, Mike Seidman, and Bill Stuntz for
comments on an earlier draft. I also benefited from feedback offered at faculty workshops at Har
vard Law School, Northwestern University School of Law, Villanova School of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law, the third annual constitutional law con
ference at the Harvard Law School, the legal history colloquium run by Stuart Banner at the UCLA
School of Law, and a graduate students' workshop run by Howard Gillman at USC. I am also grate
ful for the insightful suggestions made by students at the University of Virginia School of Law,
where I presented an early version of the ideas contained in this article at a forum sponsored by the
American Constitution Society and the Lambda Law Alliance. The reference librarians at Virginia,
and especially Ben Doherty and Kent Olson, provided their usual spectacular assistance with the
research. Meghan Cloud improved the prose with her deft editorial touch. Elizabeth Kim, Jessica
King, and Asieh Nariman provided helpful research assistance.
I dedicate this Article to the memory of my mother, Muriel Klarman (1 929-2004).
I.

347 U.S. 483 (1 954 ).

2.
See E.J. Graff, The High Court Finally Gets It Right, BosTON GLOB E , June 29, 2003, at
D I I (observing that "Lawrence is our Brown v. Board of Education"); Evan Thomas, The War over
Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38, 40 (quoting legal scholar David Garrow calling
Lawrence, along with Brown, "one of the two most important opinions of the last JOO years").
3.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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sources with broader social and political mores and the personal values of
the judges. Part II considers what these landmark decisions teach us about
the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and movements for social
reform. Part III examines the light these rulings shed on the strategic aspect
of judicial decisionmaking: how courts sometimes temper their decisions in
light of political constraints. Part IV considers the consequences of Brown
and Lawrence (and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health4) and, espe
cially, the political backlashes they ignited. Part V analyzes the rulings from
the perspective of Supreme Court Justices attempting to predict the future. A
brief conclusion speculates as to what such decisions-and history's verdict
upon them-teach us about the source of the Supreme Court's legitimacy.
I. W H Y BROWN AND LAWRENCE WERE HARD CASES
Legal scholars and political scientists have long debated how to under
stand judicial decisionmaking.5 One school, that of the "formalists," argues
that judges decide cases by interpreting legal sources, such as texts (statutes
and constitutions), the original understanding of such documents, and legal
precedents. According to an extreme version of this view, judges engaged in
constitutional adjudication "lay the article of the Constitution which is in
voked beside the statute which is challenged and . . . decide whether the
latter squares with the former."6 In its more moderate (and more plausible)
form, formalism holds that judicial decisionmaking is significantly con
strained by legal sources such as text, original understanding, and precedent,
even though some room for judicial discretion remains. 7 A competing
school, that of the "realists" or the "attitudinalists," argues that judicial in
terpretation mainly reflects the personal values of judges. 8 In its crudest
form, this perspective explains judicial decisionmaking as a reflection of
9
what the j udge ate for breakfast. In its subtler (and more plausible) form,
4.

798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

5 . For a n excellent summary of the current status o f this debate within the political science
community, see Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
"Legal Model " ofJudicial Decision Making, 26 LAW. & Soc. INQUIRY 465 (2001).
6.

United States v. Butler, 297

U.S. 1, 62 ( 1936).

7. For examples of law professors defending the moderate formalist position, see, for ex
ample, Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), and Frederick Schauer, Easy
Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985). For examples of political scientists emphasizing the impor
tance of the legal component in judicial decisionmaking, see SUPREME CouRT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell w. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinaf
ter SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING] and LEE EPSTEIN & JosEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 299-312 (1992).
8. For leading modem variants of the realist view, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 208-60 (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal &
Alfred D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U. S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. PoL. Sc1.
REV. 557 ( 1989); and Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
9. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Joseph c. Hutcheson, Jr., The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274
(1929).
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this view is encapsulated in a famous statement by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes: "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the preju
dices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
govemed." 10 Brown and Lawrence demonstrate the extent to which judicial
decisionmaking is influenced by nonlegal factors. 11
Most people today would be surprised to learn that Brown was a hard
case for the Justices: If state-mandated segregation in public schools is not
unconstitutional, what is? That the ruling in Brown was unanimous, more
over, suggests that the Justices found the case to be easy. Yet appearances
can be deceptive. In fact, the Justices were at first deeply divided on how to
resolve Brown. 12
In a memorandum to the files that he dictated the day Brown was de
cided, Justice William 0. Douglas observed that a vote taken after the case
was first argued in December 1 95 2 would have been "five to four in favor of
the constitutionality of segregation in the public schools." 13 Justice Felix
Frankfurter's head count was only slightly different: He reported that a vote
taken at that time would have been five to four to invalidate segregation,
with the majority writing several opinions. 1 4
Brown was difficult for many of the Justices because it posed a conflict
between their legal views and their personal values. The sources of constitu
tional interpretation to which they ordinarily looked for guidance-text,
original understanding, precedent, and custom-indicated that school segre
gation was permissible. By contrast, most of the Justices privately
condemned segregation, which Justice Hugo Black called "Hitler's creed."1 5
Their quandary was how to reconcile their legal and moral views.
Frankfurter's preferred approach to adjudication required that he sepa
rate his personal views from the law. He preached that judges must decide
cases based upon "the compulsions of governing legal principles," 16 not "the
10.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR ., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

11. For elaboration of this claim about the nature ofjudicial decisionmaking, see MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RA
CIAL EQUALITY 4-6, 292-312, 446-54 (2004).
12. For a more complete discussion of the Justices' internal deliberations in Brown, see id. at
292-312.
13.
Memorandum from William 0. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Segre
gation Cases file (May 17, 1954) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Douglas Papers, Box 1150).
14. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Stanley Reed,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 20, 1954) (on file with the University of Kentucky, Reed
Papers).
15. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 639 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE] (reproducing the April 8, 1950, conference discussion in Mclaurin v.
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
16. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William 0. Doug
las, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 19, 1942) (on file with the Library of Congress,
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idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment." 1 7 In a memorandum he wrote
in conjunction with the first flag-salute case in 1940, 1 8 Frankfurter noted that
"[n]o duty of judges is more important nor more difficult to discharge than
that of guarding against reading their personal and debatable opinions into
the [ c ]ase."1 9
That Frankfurter abhorred racial segregation cannot be doubted; his per
sonal behavior clearly demonstrated his egalitarian commitments. In the
1930s he had served on the legal committee of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), and in 1948 he had hired
the Court's first black law clerk, William Coleman, Jr. 20 Nonetheless, he in
sisted that his personal views were of limited relevance to the legal question
of whether segregation was constitutional: "However passionately any of us
may hold egalitarian views, however fiercely any of us may believe that
such a policy of segregation . . . is both unjust and shortsighted . . . . [h]e
travels outside his judicial authority if for this private reason alone, he de
clares [it] unconstitutional."21 The Court could invalidate segregation,
Frankfurter believed, only if it was legally as well as morally objectionable.
Yet Frankfurter had difficulty finding a compelling legal argument for
striking down segregation. His law clerk, Alexander Bickel, spent a summer
reading the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he re
ported to Frankfurter that it was "impossible" to conclude that its supporters
had intended or even foreseen the abolition of school segregation.22 To be
sure, Frankfurter believed that the meaning of constitutional concepts can
change over time,23 but as he and his colleagues deliberated, public schools
in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia were still segregated. He
could thus hardly maintain that evolving social standards condemned the
practice. Furthermore, j udicial precedent, which Frankfurter called "the
most influential factor in giving a society coherence and continuity,"24
Douglas Papers), quoted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 1941- 1953, at 1 30 (1997) [hereinafter UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DIS
CORD].
1 7.

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

18.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 16, at 109 n.112 (quoting an undated
19.
memorandum in Justice Frankfurter's handwriting found in the files on the flag salute cases).
20. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 16, at 260; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX
FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 128-29 (1991) [hereinafter UROF
SKY, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT].
21. Memorandum (first draft) from Felix Frankfurter (undated), microfonned on Frankfurter
Papers, pt. 2, reel 4, frame 378 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986)).
22. Memorandum from Alexander M. Bickel, Law Clerk, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Jus
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 22, 1953), microfonned on Frankfurter Papers, pt. 2, reel 4, frames
212-14 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986).
23.

UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD, supra note 1 6, at 217-18, 222.

MARY FRANCES BERRY, STABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONTINUITY: MR. JUSTICE BURTON
24.
AND DECISION MAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT 1 945-1958, at 142 (1978) (quoting Memorandum
of Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Conference (Dec. 20, 195 1 ) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Burton Papers, no. 195, Box 238).
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strongly supported it. Of forty-four challenges to school segregation adjudi
cated by state arspellate and federal courts between 1 865 and 1935, not one
had succeeded. 5 Indeed, on the basis of legislative history and precedent,
Frankfurter had to concede that "Plessy is right."26
Brown presented a similar dilemma for Justice Robert H. Jackson, who
also found segregation anathema. In a 1950 letter, Jackson, who had left the
Court during the 1945-1946 term to prosecute Nazis at Nuremberg, wrote to
a friend: "You and I have seen the terrible consequences of racial hatred in
Germany. We can have no sympathy with racial conceits which underlie
segregation policies."27 Yet, like Frankfurter, Jackson thought that judges
were obliged to separate their personal views from the law, and he was loath
to overrule precedent.28
Jackson revealed his internal struggles in a draft concurring opinion that
began: "Decision of these cases would be simple if our personal opinion that
school segregation is morally, economically or politically indefensible made
it legally so."29 But because Jackson believed that judges must subordinate
their personal preferences to the law, this consideration was irrelevant.
When he turned to the question of whether existing law condemned segrega
tion, he had difficulty answering in the affirmative:
Layman as well as lawyer must query how it is that the Constitution this
morning forbids what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated or ap
proved.

Convenient as it would be to reach an opposite conclusion, I simply cannot
find in the conventional material of constitutional interpretation any justifi
cation for saying that in maintaining segregated schools any state or the
District of Columbia can be judicially decreed, up to the date of this deci
sion, to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 30

That the nine Justices who initially considered Brown would be uneasy
about invalidating segregation is unsurprising. All of them had been ap
pointed by Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman on the
25. Edith Udell Fierst, Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 208, 214 n.30 (1949).
26. Douglas Conference Notes, Nos. 2 & 4, Briggs v. Elliott, Dec. 1 2, 195 3 (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Box 1150).
27. Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Charles Fairman,
Professor, Stanford University 2 (Mar. 13, 1950) (on file with Library of Congress, Jackson Papers,
Fairman file, Box 12).
28. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 5 33, 589-95 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403-04 (1943); Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash
of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMPLE L. REv.
51, 52 ( 1 999); Dwight J. Simpson, Robert H. Jackson and the Doctrine of Judicial Restraint, 3
UCLA L. REV. 325, 326-30, 338-41 (1956).
29. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, School Segregation Cases 1 (Mar. 1 5 , 1 954) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Segregation Cases, Box 184).
30.

Id. at 5, 10.
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assumption that they supported, as Jackson put it, "the doctrine on which the
Roosevelt fight against the old court was based-in part, that it had ex
panded the Fourteenth Amendment to take an unjustified judicial control
over social and economic affairs."31 For most of their professional lives,
these men had criticized untethered judicial activism as undemocratic-the
invalidation of the popular will by unelected officeholders who were inscrib
ing their social and economic biases onto the Constitution. This is how all
2
nine of them understood the Lochner3 era, when the Court had invalidated
protective labor legislation on a thin constitutional basis. The question in
Brown, as Jackson's law clerk William H. Rehnquist noted, was whether
invalidating school segregation would eliminate any distinction between this
Court and its predecessor, except for "the kinds of litigants it favors and the
kinds of special claims it protects."33
Thus, several Justices wondered whether the Court was the right institu
tion to forbid segregation. Several expressed views similar to Vinson's: If
segregation was to be condemned, "it would be better if [Congress] would
act."34 Jackson cautioned that "[h]owever desirable it may be to abolish edu
cational segregation, we cannot, with a proper sense of responsibility, ignore
the question whether the use of the judicial office to initiate law reforms that
cannot get enough national public support to put them through Congress, is
our own constitutional function."35 If the Court had to decide the question,
Jackson lamented, "then representative government ha[d] failed."36
*****

Until the current Justices' conference notes and memoranda are made
public, one cannot be certain as to what internal conflicts they may have
experienced in Lawrence.37 Still, it is likely that at least some of the Justices
in the majority found Lawrence hard-and for pretty much the same reasons
that several Justices were conflicted over Brown.
Lawrence, like Brown, required the Justices to overturn a precedent
Bowers v. Hardw ick38 and a fairly recent one at that. Three of the six Jus
tices who voted to invalidate the Texas same-sex sodomy statute-Sandra
-

31 .

Letter from Jackson to Fairman, supra note 27, at 2.

32.

Lochner v. New York, 1 98 U.S. 45 (1905) .

33. Memorandum of WHR (William H. Rehnquist), A Random Thought on the Segregation
Cases (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Box 1 84).
34. Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes, Segregation Cases (Dec. 13, 1952) (on file with
Library of Congress, Burton Papers, Box 244).
35. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Concurrence, School Segregation Cases 7 (Dec. 7, 1953) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Jackson Papers, Segregation Cases, Box 1 84).
36. William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes, Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School
Board (Dec. 1 2, 1953) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers,
Segregation Cases, Box 1 1 49).
37.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

38.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter-had co-authored the
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
39
Casey, which stressed the importance of precedent to the rule of law: "Lib
erty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."40 As Justice Antonin Scalia
pointed out in his Lawrence dissent, the treatments of precedent in Casey
and Lawrence are-to put it mildly-in some tension with one another.4 1
Moreover, Lawrence, like Brown, adopts an interpretation of the Four
teenth Amendment that significantly departs from its original understanding.
The thirty-ninth Congress was no more committed to protecting gay rights
than it was to barring school segregation.42
Further, because Justices Kennedy and O'Connor generally disfavor
identifying new fundamental rights or suspect classes,43 both of their opin
ions in Lawrence rule the Texas statute deficient without applying a
heightened standard of review.44 Yet invalidating the law under minimum
rationality review is difficult to justify, given the extreme deference the
Court has traditionally shown when applying that standard.45 Until 196 1

39.

505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).

40.

Id. at 844.

41. Lawrence, 5 39 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of being "ma
nipulative in invoking the doctrine" of stare decisis and criticizing its failure to distinguish Casey's
treatment of precedent); see Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal: Massachusetts Gets It Wrong on
Gay Marriage, NEW RE PUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 19 [hereinafter Rosen, Immodest Proposal] (criti
cizing the "cavalier treatment of precedent" in Lawrence).
42. On the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to school segre
gation, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., con
curring) (concluding "that there is no generalized right to 'commit suicide' " but leaving open "the
question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief
from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives"); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating under minimum rationality review Colorado's constitutional amend
ment denying protected status to homosexuals and declining to rule that homosexuality is a suspect
status or that any fundamental right was implicated here); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
750-51 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority, in an opinion in which O'Connor, J.,
joined) (refusing to hold that a right against pretrial detention is " 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' " (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934))); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242-54 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined
by O'Connor, J.) (denying that illegal aliens are a suspect class or that education is a fundamental
right).
44. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449-50
(2004) (noting that the majority opinion in Lawrence fails to state what level of scrutiny it is apply
ing to the Texas statute); Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1 578 (2004) (same).
45. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (noting that the Equal Pro
tection Clause is "offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective"); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955)
(applying an extremely deferential standard under minimum rationality review).
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every state in the nation had a law forbidding same-sex sodomy.46 It strains
7
credulity to suggest that all those states were acting irrationally. 4
Finally, Kennedy and O'Connor reveal discomfort with the stated ra
tionales underlying their opinions by insisting on limiting their reach by fiat.
Kennedy insists that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause "pre
sumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
8
expression, and certain intimate conduct."4 O'Connor both portrays the

Texas statute as motivated by simple animus or hatred and rejects "moral
9
disapproval" as a legitimate government purpose. 4 Yet both Justices caution

that other laws disadvantaging gays and lesbians-for example, bans on
same-sex marriage-would not necessarily be susceptible to those objec

tions. 50 They offer no convincing bases for drawing such a distinction,

however, and Scalia powerfully charges in dissent that "only if one enter

tains the belief that principle and logic have nothin� to do with the decisions
of this Court" can such a distinction be maintained. '
One cannot know for sure, but Lawrence probably presented the same

conflict between law and personal values for Justices

Kennedy and

O'Connor that Brown did for Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.52 Kennedy

and O'Connor were likely offended by the criminal prosecution of private,
consensual, adult sexual activity; even Justice Thomas, who dissented,

thought the statute "uncommonly silly."53 Yet, Kennedy's and O'Connor's

favored approaches to constitutional interpretation revealed no obvious legal
flaws in the Texas statute.

That the opinions in Brown and Lawrence rely partially on unconven

tional legal sources supports the notion that some of the Justices found the

cases difficult. Brown's famous footnote

11

invoked social science evidence

to show that racial segregation in grade school education generated feelings

of inferiority among blacks. The use of such evidence in a Supreme Court
opinion was virtually unprecedented, the particular evidence invoked was
deeply flawed, and the left-wing political credentials of some of the aca-

46.

B owers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 ( 1986).

47. See Lawrence, 5 39 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for applying "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review"); id. at 604 (accusing the majority of
"having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence").
48.

Lawrence, 5 39 U.S. at 562.

49.

Id. at 580-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

50.

Id. at 578; id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

51.

Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Cf Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
52.
Marriage, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 34 (noting that the Justices in the majority in Lawrence probably
faced a dilemma because they thought the Texas statute had to be struck down but that any rationale
for invalidation "would inevitably raise serious doubts about practices, including the ban on same
sex marriages, that the majority did not want to question").

5 3. Lawrence, 5 39 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut,
38 1 U.S. 479, 527 ( 1 965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Sunstein, supra note 52, at 31 (noting
that Lawrence "was possible only because of the ludicrously poor fit between the sodomy prohibi
tion and the society in which the Justices live").
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demic experts cited invited criticism from McCarthyites. 54 Justice Jackson

himself disparaged the NAACP's brief, which he said "starts and ends with
sociology." 55 Judge George Bell Timmerman of South Carolina, alluding to
footnote

1 1,

insisted that "[t]he judicial power of the United States . . . does

not extend to the enforcement of Marxist socialism as interpreted by Myr
dal, the Swedish Socialist."5 6 Why Chief Justice Earl Warren chose to insert
7
the controversial social science evidence into the footnote is unclear, 5 but

the NAACP probably relied on it in the litigation partly because the conven
tional sources of constitutional interpretation were so unsupportive of the
8
challenge to school segregation.5
Similarly in Lawrence, the majority opinion relies partly on an unortho

dox source for interpreting the U.S. Constitution:

a decision by the

European Court of Human Rights.59 For the Justices to invoke a ruling from
a foreign court as authority for their interpretation of the U.S. Constitution is

virtually unprecedented. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Lawrence dis
0
Perhaps one can attribute such a

sent, it is also highly controversial.6

reference to the effects of globalization; these days, the Justices spend more

time in other countries and interact more with foreign judges. Alternatively,
the invocation of a precedent from the European court may reflect the

54. See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 50, 1 57-68 ( 1955); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 , 32-33 ( 1 959);
Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme
Coun's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 80 1 --09 (2002).
55. Tom C. Clark, Conference Notes, Brown v. Board of Education (on file with University
of Texas, Tarlton Law Library, Clark Papers, Box A27).
56.

S.C. Negroes Ask to Transfer to State University, So. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), Feb. 1 958,

at 7.
57. For some interesting speculation, see Mody, supra note 54, at 8 1 4--28, suggesting that
the Brown Court relied on social science evidence to help legitimize a ruling that departed from
conventional approaches to constitutional interpretation.
58.
Cf RICHARD KLuGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 321 ( 1 976) (noting that some NAACP lawyers
ridiculed the social science evidence but that "Thurgood Marshall was taking all the help he could
get").
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (sec. A) ( 1 98 1 ) as refutation of "the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insub
stantial in our Western civilization"); id. at 576 (noting subsequent decisions by the European Court
of Human Rights adhering to Dudgeon).
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's invocation of
foreign precedents "[d]angerous dicta"); see also Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 5 80--8 1
(criticizing the Court for looking to foreign legal decisions as support for an interpretation o f the
U.S. Constitution); Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 4 1 , at 2 1 (noting that the invocation of a
ruling by the European court in Lawrence confirms the fears of social conservatives who dread the
internationalization of U.S. domestic Jaw).
In the spring of 2004, dozens of congressional representatives sponsored a resolution in the
House criticizing the Supreme Court for citing foreign legal authority in recent decisions, including
Lawrence. The Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution declared that "inappropriate
judicial reliance on foreign judgments, Jaws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the
United States, the separation of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making author
ity." H.R. Res. 568, 1 08th Cong. (2004). Rep. Tom Feeney, a Florida Republican who introduced the
resolution, warned in an interview that judges who based their decisions on foreign precedents
would risk the "ultimate remedy" of impeachment. Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the
Supreme Coun, MSNBC.com, Mar. 1 1 , 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/.
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Justices' concern in Lawrence that the conventional sources of U.S. constitu

tional law did not adequately support the result.

II. COURT AS VANGUARD OR LAGGARD?
Scholars and judges have long disagreed about the extent to which the

Supreme Court acts as a countermajoritarian force in U.S. society. Justice
Black once stated the conventional wisdom in particularly ringing terms:

Courts stand "as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer be

cause they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are the non
1
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."6 In his famous

concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,62 Justice Louis Brandeis simi

larly opined that one function of judicial review is to protect against "the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities."63 Like-minded scholars have

written that without judicial review "there would be little hope for rights or
for equality,"64 that courts "restrain the majority's worst excesses,"65 and that

judicial review "advances the cause of peaceful change" by preventing the
"[o]ppression of individuals and minorities" that might encourage resort to

the right of revolution.66

By contrast, other scholars have denied that the Court has either the in
clination or the capacity to play this role of "countermajoritarian hero."67 In
a classic article, the political scientist Robert Dahl observed that, given any

reasonable set of assumptions about the nature of the political process, "it

would appear to be somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either
would or could play the role of Galahad."68 Law professor Barry Friedman

61.

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 ( 1 940).

62.

274 U.S. 357 ( 1 927).

63. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 3 10,
3 1 8 ( 1990); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902--03 ( 1 990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 3 1 0 U.S. 586, 606 ( 1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
64. JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECt.AJMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 282 ( 1 983).
65.

Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 287 ( 1983).

66. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Warren Court and the Bill of Rights, 56 YALE REV. 1 97,
2 10 (1 967).
67. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo
lutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 , 2 ( 1996) (citing examples of such scholarship).
68. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 284 ( 1957). For additional scholarship denying that the Court is
heroically countermajoritarian, see Robert G. McCloskey, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224
( 1 960) ("it is hard to find a single instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a
really clear wave of public demand"); David G. Barnum & John L. Sullivan, The Elusive Founda
tions of Political Freedom in Britain and the United States, 52 J. POL. 7 19, 731-32 ( 1 990); William
Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Deci
sion Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. Pot.. 169 ( 1 996); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure
Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1 97 1 , 1 973-74 ( 1 990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 Tux. L. REv. 1 88 1 , 1 890 ( 199 1 ); and compare GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? ( 1 99 1 ) (arguing
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likewise denies the existence of any significant counterrnajoritarian func
tion, contending instead that judicial review should be seen as part of a
9
"dialogue" between the judicial and legislative branches.6 Brown and Law
rence shed light on how countennajoritarian the Court's rulings generally
are.
As we have seen, in 1954 the law-as understood by most of the Jus
tices-was reasonably clear: segregation was constitutional. For the Justices
to reject a result so clearly indicated by the conventional legal sources sug10
gests that they had very strong personal preferences to the contrary. And so
they did. Although the Court had unanimously and casually endorsed public
school segregation as recently as 1927,7 1 by the early 1950s, the views of
most of the Justices reflected the dramatic popular changes in racial atti
tudes and practices that had resulted from World War II. 72 The ideology of
the war was antifascist and prodemocratic, and the contribution of African
American soldiers was undeniable. Upon their return to the South, thou
sands of black veterans tried to vote, many expressing the view of one such
veteran that "after having been overseas fighting for democracy, I thought
that when we got back here we should enjoy a little of it."73 Thousands more
joined the NAACP, and many became civil rights litigants. Others helped
launch a postwar social movement for racial justice.
Other developments in the 1940s also fueled African American progress.
Over the course of the decade, more than one and a half million southern
blacks, pushed by changes in southern agriculture and pulled by wartime
industrial demand, migrated to northern cities. This mass relocation-from a
region in which blacks were almost universally disfranchised to one in
which they could vote nearly without restriction-greatly enhanced their
political power; indeed, they became a key swing constituency in the North.
that courts cannot effectuate significant social change independently of broad extralegal forces and
thus implicitly denying the existence of a substantial countermajoritarian problem); and Mark A.
Graber, The Nonrnajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. PoL.
DEV. 35 ( 1 993) (arguing that many landmark instances of judicial review, such as Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 ( 1 857) and Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1973), involve not countermajoritari
anism, but rather legislative delegation to courts of difficult issues that threaten to disrupt existing
political coalitions).
69. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 ( 1 993); accord
Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 257, 1 259 (2004) [hereinafter Friedman, Importance of Being Positive] (arguing
that the Supreme Court's role in judicial review is mainly "forcing a conversation within the polity
about what the Constitution should mean"); see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 537, 1 55 1 -52 (2004) (noting that courts only protect minor
ity groups that the majority wishes to see protected).
70.
For a similar example of this phenomenon, see B ush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See
generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1 72 1 (200 1 ) (arguing that the result in Bush can only be understood as a reflection of the con
servative Justices' personal preferences).
71.

Gong Lum v . Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).

72.
The following discussion is based on KLARMAN, supra note II, at 1 73-96 (citing rele
vant sources).
73.
ROBERT J. NORR ELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
TuSKEGEE 60-61 ( 1 998).
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Other blacks migrated from farms to cities within the South, facilitating the

creation of a black middle class that had the inclination, capacity, and op
portunity to engage in organized social protest.

The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s created another impetus for

racial reform. In the ideological contest with communism, American democ
racy

was

on

trial,

and

southern

white

supremacy

was

its

greatest

vulnerability. The Justice Department's brief in Brown, which urged the

Court to invalidate school segregation, emphasized that "[r]acial discrimina
7
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills." 4 After Brown,

supporters of the decision boasted that the United States' leadership of the

free world "now rests on a firmer basis" and that American democracy had
75

been "vindicat[ed] . . . in the eyes of the world."

By the early 1950s such forces had produced concrete racial reforms. In

1947, Jackie Robinson desegregated major league baseball. In 1948, Presi

dent Truman issued executive orders desegregating the federal military and

civil service. Dramatic changes in racial practices were occurring even in

the South. Black voter registration there increased from three percent in
7
1940 to twenty percent in 1952. 6 Dozens of urban police forces in the
South, including some in Mississippi, hired their first black officers. Minor

league baseball teams, even in such places as Montgomery and Birming

ham, Alabama, signed their first black players. Most southern states

peacefully desegregated their graduate and professional schools under court

order. Blacks began serving again on southern juries. In many southern
states, the first blacks since Reconstruction were elected to urban political

offices, and the walls of segregation were occasionally breached in public

facilities and accommodations.

As they deliberated over Brown, the Justices expressed astonishment at

the extent of the recent changes. Sherman Minton detected "a different
77
world today" with regard to race. Frankfurter noted "the great changes in

the relations between white and colored people since the first World War"

and remarked that "the pace of progress has surprised even those most eager
78
in its promotion." Jackson may have gone furthest, citing black advance

ment as a constitutional justification for eliminating segregation. In his draft

opinion he wrote that segregation "has outlived whatever justification it may

have had . . . . Negro progress under segregation has been spectacular and,

tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dra-

74. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483
(1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
75.

Educators Comment on Schools Decision, Cm. DEFENDER, May 22, 1954, at 5.

76. DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 , at 7 tbl. 1 - 1 (1978).
77. Harold H. Burton, Conference Notes, School Segregation Cases (Dec. 12, 1953) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, BurtonPapers, Box 244).
78.

Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, supra note 21.
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Blacks had thus overcome the pre

sumptions on which segregation was based.
It was these sorts of changes-political, social, demographic, and ideo

logical-that made Brown possible. Frankfurter later conceded that he

would have voted to uphold public school segregation in the 1940s because
so
"public opinion had not then crystallized against it." The Justices in Brown

did not think that they were creating a movement for racial reform; they un

derstood that they were working with, not against, historical forces. By the
time the Court struck down school segregation, polls revealed that a narrow
s
majority of Americans approved of the decision. '

Lawrence, like Brown, came in the wake of extraordinary changes in at
s
titudes and practices regarding homosexuality. 2 In 1986, Chief Justice

Warren Burger in his concurring opinion in Bowers recited Blackstone's
condemnation of homosexuality as an offense of "deeper malignity" than
s
rape. 3 In the seventeen years between Bowers and Lawrence, public opinion
went from opposing the legalization of homosexual relations by fifty-five

percent to thirty-three percent to supporting legalization by sixty percent to
8
thirty-five percent. 4 Many states, either through legislative or judicial ac
s
tion, nullified laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy. 5 Several states and

scores of cities added protection for sexual orientation to their antidiscrimi
s6
nation laws. Nearly two hundred Fortune 500 companies extended job
s7
related benefits to gay partners, as did several states and scores of munici
ss
palities for their public employees. The Hawaii Supreme Court invalidated

79.

Jackson, supra note 29, at 1, 19-2 1 .

80. Memorandum from William 0. Douglas (Jan. 25, 1 960), reprinted in THE DOUGLAS
LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 1 69 (Melvin I.
Urofsky ed., 1 987).
8 1 . GEORGE H. GALLUP, 2 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1 935-197 1 , at 1 249-50
( 1 972) (noting polls in the summer of 1954 showing fifty-four percent approving of Brown and
forty-one percent disapproving); see also Balkin, supra note 69, at 1 538-39 (noting that one lesson
of Brown is that the Court acts largely in accordance with national majorities).
82. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 52, at 28-29 (noting that "[i]n the area of sexual orienta
tion, America is in the midst of a civil rights revolution").
83.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1 86, 1 97 ( 1 986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

Gallup Poll, May 5-7, 2003, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of
84.
Connecticut, accession# 0429847, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database; see also
Paul. R. Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J. PoL. 1 208,
1 208--09 (2003) (noting a substantial reduction during the 1 990s in the percentage of Americans
who regard same-sex relations as wrong).
85.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
168 (1999).
86.
Id. at 130, 1 39, 233, app. B2; BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN
MOVEMENT 1 23 ( 1987).
87. Thomas, supra note 2, at 45 (noting the number of Fortune 500 companies offering bene
fits to gay partners rose from 1 in 1992 to 197 in 2003).
88. John Cloud, The Battle over Gay Marriage, TIME, Feb. 1 6, 2004, at 56; Lisa Duggan,
Holy Matrimony!, NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 14.
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and the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that
90
In the

same-sex couples must at least be permitted to form "civil unions."

1990s, hundreds of openly gay men and women were elected to public of

fices, and gays and lesbians entered mainstream culture on television, film,
and music; in 1998, an openly gay man won a Pulitzer Prize for the first
91
time.
In 2003 the Episcopalian Church ordained its first openly gay
.
bIShOp.92
Both Brown and Lawrence reflected, at least as much as they produced,

changes in social attitudes and practices. This is not to suggest that the

Court is a perfect mirror of society. Indeed, the Justices share certain charac

teristics that set them apart from average Americans: they are older, better
93
educated, and more affluent. On some public policy disputes that become

constitutional issues, these characteristics correlate with certain views. For

example, better-educated, relatively affluent people are much more likely to
favor abortion rights and to oppose school prayer than are average Ameri-

cans. 94

Occasionally, the culturally elite values of the Justices make them more

receptive than the general population to social reform. In 1954, opinion

polls showed that nearly half of all Americans supported racial segregation

in public schools, whereas college graduates condemned that practice by
95
nearly three to one. Reflecting the values of the cultural elite, the Justices
in Brown unanimously condemned public school segregation.

Today, attitudes toward homosexuality strongly correlate with socioeco

nomic status: better-educated, affluent people are generally much more

supportive of gay rights than are average Americans. For example, one poll

taken in 1999 found that seventy-four percent of respondents with post

graduate education would vote for a well-qualified homosexual for president
9
but only forty-six percent of high school dropouts would do so. 6 Yet, on

89.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

90.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS : THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVE
MENTS IN THE UNITED STATES I (2002).
91.
92.

See Laurie Goodstein, Openly Gay Man Is Made a Bishop, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 3, 2003, at

Al.
Michael J . Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U . L . REV. 145,
93.
189-91 (1998).
94.

Id. at 190 n.245.

95.

2 GALLUP, supra note 81, at 1250.

96.
Gallup Poll, Feb. 19-21, 1999, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of
Connecticut, accession# 0365291, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database; see also
Press Release, George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Little Change Found in Public's Acceptance of
Homosexuality (Nov. 7, 1982) [hereinafter Gallup, Little Change] (on file with author) (noting that a
poll conducted in June 1982 found that among those with a college education 44% thought that
homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle and 46% thought not, while among those with only a high
school education the corresponding numbers were 32% and 52%, and among those with only a
grade school education the numbers were 17% and 59%); Press Release, George Gallup, Difficult
Lot of Homosexual Seen in New Survey Findings (July 19, 1977) [hereinafter Gallup, Difficult Lot]
(on file with the American Institute of Public Opinion) (noting a poll showing that among those with
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gay-rights issues, another of the Justices' systemic biases has a partially off

setting effect: attitudes toward homosexuality also strongly correlate with
age: older people are generally much less tolerant than are younger people.
For example, one recent opinion poll shows that respondents aged eighteen
to twenty-nine favor legalization of "homosexual relations" by fifty-eight

percent to thirty-nine percent, while those aged sixty-five and over oppose
97
legalization by sixty-one percent to twenty-four percent. On gay rights,

then, one might have predicted that the Court would be less far in advance
of public opinion than it had been on race. This, in fact, has almost surely

been the case. The Justices' age bias may help explain why Bowers v.
Hardwick was decided as it was and why the Court took so long to overrule
it.

The main point, though, is that neither Brown nor Lawrence created a

new movement for social reform; both decisions supported movements that

had already acquired significant momentum by the time their grievances had

reached the Supreme Court. To be sure, Brown occurred earlier in the course

of the civil rights movement than Lawrence did in the course of the gay
98
rights movement. Opinion polls showed only a slender national majority
supporting Brown in 1954, whereas by 2003 it was hard to find anyone sup

porting criminal prosecution for private, consensual, adult same-sex
99
relations. But neither ruling was at the vanguard of a social reform move

ment, as was the California Supreme Court decision in 1948 striking down a
100
or the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision
ban on interracial marriage
1
in 2003 striking down a ban on same-sex marriage.w The U.S. Supreme

Court rarely, if ever, plays such an adventurous role.w2

a college background 57% thought that homosexual relations should be legal and 35% that they
should not, while among those with a high school education the corresponding numbers were 42%
and 44%, and among those with only a grade school education the numbers were 21% and 57%).
97.
Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support ls Found for Ban on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 21, 2003, at Al ; see also NAT' L Pus. RADIO, GAY MARRIAGE AND CIVIL UNIONS
(2003) (noting that people aged eighteen to twenty-nine oppose gay marriage by 45% to 39%,
whereas people aged sixty-four and over oppose i t by 75% to 18%); Public Opinion Online, supra
note 96 (reporting an opinion poll finding that 65% of people under aged twenty-nine would vote
for a qualified homosexual for president but only 39% of people aged seventy and older would d o
so) ; Gallup, Little Change, supra note 9 6 (noting that a poll conducted in June 1982 found that
among those aged 18 to 29, 40% thought homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle and 46% did
not, while among those aged 30 to 49 the corresponding numbers were 37% and 50%, and among
those aged 50 and older the numbers were 25% and 57%); Gallup, Difficult Lot, supra note 96
(reporting a poll taken in 1977 that showed that among those aged 30 and under, 57% thought that
homosexual relations should be legal and 34% thought they should not, while among those aged 3 0
t o 4 9 the corresponding numbers were 47% and 41% , and among those 5 0 and over the numbers
were 29% and 53%).
98.

Balkin, supra note 69, at 1542 & n.24.

99.

See infra notes 340-345 and accompanying text.

J OO.

Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).

IOI.

Goodridge v. Dep' t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

102.
See Balkin, supra note 69, at 1546 (observing that the Supreme Court is better at "piling
on" than at "tackling"); Friedman, Importance ofBeing Positive, supra note 69, at 1279 (concluding
that "the Court operates on a leash," which prevents it from deviating far from public opini on).
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III . J UDICIAL S TRATEGIZI NG-E VADING THE M ARRIAGE ISSUE

Scholars have written a good deal about the strategic element of judicial
decisionmak:ing-that is, the extent to which judges decide cases not simply
on the basis of good-faith interpretations of the relevant legal sources but
also on calculations regarding the political feasibility of implementing vari

ous

rulings. Political scientists especially have described many such
10
instances of judicial strategizing. 3 Legal scholars have been more inclined

to debate the normative defensibility of such politically informed decision
1 04
mak:ing.
Both Brown and Lawrence illustrate this strategic aspect of
judicial decisionmak:ing.

Both opinions were consciously written narrowly to avoid resolving the

whole range of issues regarding classifications based on race and sexual

orientation. Brown was decided as an education case. The Court emphasized

that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
ws
and held only that "(s]eparate educational facilities are in
1 06
herently unequal."
The Justices deliberately refrained from announcing a
governments"

presumptive ban on all racial classifications. One principal reason they did

so was to avoid calling into question the constitutionality of state laws bar
10
ring interracial marriage. 7
Many southern whites had charged that the real goal of the NAACP's

school desegregation campaign was "to open the bedroom doors of our
1 08
1 09
white women to the Negro men" and "to mongrelize the white race." For
103.

For scholarship emphasizing the strategic aspects of j udicial decisionmaking, see WAL-

TER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 171-75, 186--97, 204-10 (1964); Lee Epstein &
Thomas G. Wal ker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction

Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315 (Lee Epstein ed . , 1995); Mark A. Graber, Federalist or
Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. PoL . DEV. 229 (1998);
Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Estab
lishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were
the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1157--64 (2001); Klarman, supro
note 70, at 1757--60; Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. &
Soc'y REv. 87 (1996); and Forrest Maltzman et al., Strotegy and Judicial Choice: New Institutional
ist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra
note 7, at 43--63.
104.
Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 174 (1962) (defending
strategizing in some circumstances), with PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FED
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 660--62 (2d ed . 1973) (criticizing such strategizing), and
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "A Comment on Principle and Expediency
in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964) (same); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
105.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added) .

106.

Id. at 495 (emphasis added).

107.
Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 241-43 (1991).
108.

A labama: Marengo Meeting, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Jan. 6, 1955, at 2.

109.
A ttacks NAACP, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 1955, at 9 (quoting state senator Sam
Engelhardt of Macon County, Ala.). For additional statements to s imilar effect, see TOM B RADY,
B LACK MONDAY 64--67 (1954); HERMAN E. TALMADGE, You AND SEGREGATION 42-44 (1955); and
Walter B. Jones, I Speak for the White Race, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 4, 1957, microformed
on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 4, frame 436 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.).
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the Justices to strike down antimiscegenation laws so soon after Brown
might have appeared to validate such suspicions. Moreover, opinion polls in

the 1950s revealed that over ninety percent of whites--even outside of the
1 10
South--opposed interracial marriage. During oral argument in one of the

original school segregation cases, Justice Frankfurter had seemed relieved

when counsel denied that barring school segregation would necessarily in
111
validate antimiscegenation laws.
Frankfurter later explained that one
reason that Brown was written as it was--emphasizing the importance of

public education rather than condemning all racial classifications-was to
112
avoid the miscegenation issue.

However, the Justices were quickly confronted with cases that seemed to

require them to acknowledge that Brown's logic extended beyond the sphere
of education. In 1955-1956 the Court faced challenges to state-mandated
segregation of public beaches, golf courses, and local transportation. Be

cause Brown had emphasized the importance of public education rather than

questioning the validity of all racial classifications, invalidating segregation

in these post-Brown cases seemed to require additional explanation. Yet the

Justices provided none, instead issuing cursory per curiam opinions that
11
merely cited Brown. 3 Those legal academics most committed to "reasoned
11
elaboration" in j udicial decisionmaking were virtually apoplectic. 4
Yet even these post-Brown per curiams stopped short of invalidating an

timiscegenation laws. The Justices had an opportunity to determine the

constitutionality of such laws, but they refused to take it, even though avoid

ing it required them to act disingenuously. The case was Nairn v. Naim.

1 15

There, a Chinese man and a white woman had tried to circumvent V irginia's

ban on interracial marriage by wedding in North Carolina. After returning to

Virginia, the woman later sought an annulment under the antimiscegenation

law, which her husband then challenged as unconstitutional. The trial court
granted the annulment, and the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed, sustain
ing the statute.

This was the last case the Justices wished to see on their docket in 1955,

but it seemed to fall within the Court's mandatory j urisdiction. Today, the

Justices have almost complete discretion over their docket, but in the mid-

1950s federal law still required them to grant appeals when state courts had

1 1 0.

2 GALLUP , supra note 81, at 1572.

1 1 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 ( 1 954) (No. 413),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 74, at 40506. Justice Frankfurter asked counsel whether striking down school segregation would necessarily
lead the Court to invalidate antimiscegenation laws and then praised the answer that such legislation
would be suspect but not necessarily prohibited. Id.

1 1 2.

GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 664-70 ( 1 994).

113. E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
1 1 4. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1 64-70 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds ., 1994); Wechsler, supra note 54, at 11- 1 2, 15-17.
115.

Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 89 1 ( 1 955).
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11
rejected federal claims that were not "insubstantial." 6 To say that antimis

cegenation laws posed an insubstantial constitutional question would have
been absurd. The importance was "obvious," law clerk William A. Norris
(later a judge on the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) told Justice

Douglas, and "[f]ailure to decide the case would blur any distinction re
11 7
maining between certiorari and appeal."
Justice Harold Burton's clerk

agreed that the Court could not honestly avoid the case, though he would
118
have preferred to "give the present fire a chance to bum down."

Both clerks underestimated the desperation and creativity of the Justices.
119
Though several Justices wished to take jurisdiction, others searched for an
escape route. Justice Tom Clark suggested one: the plaintiff should be es

topped from invoking the antimiscegenation law because she knew of the

defendant's race when they married and deliberately evaded the statutory
1 20
B urton suggested another: they could dismiss the case on the

prohibition.

independent state-law ground that V irginia required residents to
1 21
within the state-a plainly erroneous reading of Virginia law.

marry

Of all the Justices, Frankfurter felt the gravest anxiety about the case. If

this had been a certiorari petition, he would have rejected it, as "due consid

eration of important public consequences is relevant to the exercise of
1 22
discretion in passing on such petitions."
(Indeed, in 1 954 the Court had
12
denied certiorari in another southern miscegenation case. 3) But Nairn was
an appeal, and Frankfurter admitted that the challenge to antimiscegenation
12
laws "cannot be rejected as frivolous." 4 Still, the "moral considerations" for

dismissing the appeal "far outweigh the technical considerations in noting
12
jurisdiction." 5 To thrust the miscegenation issue into "the vortex of the pre
sent disquietude" would risk "thwarting or seriously handicapping the

1 1 6.

28 u.s.c. § 1 257 ( 1 952).

Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc.
1 1 7.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Oct. 24, 1 955) (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99, Box 1 1 64); see also
Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court, 42
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 1 9, 1 49-50 (1998) (noting other similar statements).
1 1 8.
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 , 63 ( 1 979) (quoting Memorandum of AJM, Law Clerk, to Harold
H. Burton, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Oct. 1 955)).
1 1 9.

Dorr, supra note 1 1 7, at 153-54; Hutchinson, supra note 1 1 8, at 64.

Tom C. Clark, handwritten note to Robert H. Jackson, Nairn v. Nairn (on file with the
1 20.
University of Texas, Tarlton Law Library, Clark Papers, Box A47).
121.
Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Supplemental memorandum regarding Nairn v. Nairn (undated) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99,
Box 1 1 64).
1 22.
Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum, Nairn v. Nairn (microformed on Frankfurter Papers, pt.
2, reel 1 7, frames 588-90 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1986)).
1 23 .

Jackson v. Alabama, 7 2 So. 2 d 1 1 6 (Ala. 1 954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 ( 1 954).

1 24.

Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum, supra note 122.

1 25.

id.
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enforcement of [Brown]." 126 Frankfurter's proposed solution, which the Jus
tices adopted, was to remand the case to the Virginia court of appeals with
instructions to return it to the trial court for further proceedings in order to
clarify the parties' relationship to the commonwealth, which was said to be
uncertain from the record; clarification might obviate the need to resolve the
constitutional question. 127 On remand, the Virginia jurists refused to comply
with the Court's instructions; they denied that the record was unclear and
that state law permitted returning final decisions to trial courts in order to
gather additional evidence. 128 Virginia newspapers treated the state court's
response as an instance of nullification. 129
The petitioner then filed a motion to recall the Court's mandate and to
set the case for argument. Douglas's law clerk, Norris, now identified three
options that were available. The Court could summarily vacate the state
judgment to "punish" Virginia for its disobedience. 130 Norris thought that
this solution would be "intemperate and would unnecessarily increase the
friction between this Court and the southern state courts." Second, the Jus
tices could circumvent the recalcitrant state high court and remand the case
directly to the trial court. Finally, they could take the appeal, which would
be a "tacit admission that the Court's original remand was unnecessary." 131
Norris favored the last option and warned that "[i]t will begin to look obvi
ous if the case is not taken that the Court is trying to run away from its
obligation to decide the case." 132
Norris failed even to imagine the option chosen by a majority
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the Virginia court's response
"leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal question." 133 A ma
jority of the Justices apparently preferred being humiliated at the hands of
truculent state jurists to further stoking the fires of racial controversy ignited
by Brown. Once again, those academic commentators most committed to
"reasoned elaboration" in judicial decisionmaking scored the Court for tak
ing action that was "wholly without basis in the law."134 Not until the 1960s

1 26.

Id.

1 27 .

Nairn v . Nairn, 3 5 0 U.S. 89 1 ( 1955); Hutchinson, supra note 1 1 8, at 64-66.

128.

Nairn v. Nairn, 9 0 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1 956).

1 29.

See Dorr, supra note 1 1 7, at 156.

Memorandum from WAN (William A. Norris, Law Clerk) to William 0. Douglas, Assoc.
1 30.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari in Nairn v. Nairn (Mar. I , 1 956) (on file with Douglas Pa
pers, Office Memos, nos. 350-99, Box 1 1 64).
131.

Id.

1 32.

Id.

133.
Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); see also Handwritten Note from Felix Frankfurter,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Tom. C. Clark, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (un
dated) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Clark Papers, Box A47) (noting that
Frankfurter's proposed disposition of the case, which is what the Court ultimately adopted, "fills me
with hope, confident hope, that my anxiety will soon be lifted").
1 34.

Wechsler, supra note 54, at 34; see also supra note 1 14 and accompanying text.
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13
would the Court announce a presumptive ban on racial classifications, 5 and
13 6
not until 1967 would it strike down antimiscegenation laws.
* * * * *

In Lawrence, the Justices likewise strained to avoid resolving the same
7
sex marriage issue.13 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion emphasized that

the case involved "the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in
138
the most private of places, the home." He also carefully noted that the case
did not "involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
19
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." 3
Justice

any

O'Connor's concurring opinion similarly stressed that just because "this law

as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between

heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis
14°
review." Further, she noted that in its effort to defend its ban on same-sex

sodomy, Texas had failed to assert a legitimate interest, "such as national
141
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage."
O'Connor

even went so far as to stipulate, without explication, that "other reasons exist

to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
1
excluded group." 4 2 She could hardly have been clearer in signaling her un

willingness to commit to invalidating bans on openly gay military service

and same-sex marriage.

That Kennedy and O'Connor would go to such lengths to deny that

Lawrence has implications for same-sex marriage is not surprising. Just as at
the time of Brown a majority of Americans opposed public school segrega

tion but overwhelmingly supported antimiscegenation laws, so at the time of

Lawrence public opinion opposed criminal prosecution of private gay sex
but supported by a two-to-one margin laws restricting marriage to unions
1
between men and women. 43

Justice O'Connor's constitutional jurisprudence-and, perhaps to a

somewhat lesser extent, Justice Kennedy's-reveals a strong sensitivity fo
1
public opinion. 44 On the question of whether it was constitutional to execute
135.
ring).
136.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 1 84, 1 92-93, 196 (1964); id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concur
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 ( 1 967).

See Karlan, supra note 44, at 1459-60 (noting that the majority in Lawrence may have
1 37.
feared that invalidating the Texas law under the Equal Protection Clause would have required it to
strike down all laws treating gays and straights differently, including marriage laws).
138.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).

139.

Id. at 578.

140.

Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

141.

Id.

142.

Id.

143.

See infra notes 340--345 and accompanying text.

144.

See, e.g., Friedman, Importance of Being Positive, supra note 69, at 1 302.
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the mentally retarded, O'Connor and Kennedy were apparently more influ

enced than other Justices by the number of states that had recently forbidden
1
the practice. 4 5They seem more comfortable than the other conservative Jus
tices in using the Constitution to suppress outliers but less comfortable than
some of the liberals in using the Constitution to resist majority opinion.

Likewise, on abortion and affirmative action, O'Connor's apparent shifts

over time toward a more liberal position can be plausibly attributed to
1
changes in public opinion. 4 6 No Court on which O'Connor is the median
Justice will invalidate bans on same-sex marriage any time soon.

Yet just as Brown led inexorably, albeit gradually, to a presumptive judi

cial ban on all racial classifications, so is La.wrence likely to lead eventually
to a

esumptive judicial ban on all classifications based on sexual orienta
w
tion. 47 W hereas Kennedy and O'Connor insist that Lawrence has no

necessary implications for same-sex marriage, Justice Scalia's dissent

rightly observes that they offer no basis-other than what he calls a "bald,
1
unreasoned disclaimer"-for distinguishing that issue. 48 Lawrence denies

that "moral disapproval" of homosexuality is a legitimate state interest. It is

difficult, however, to identify a state interest other than moral disapproval
1
that would convincingly justify banning same-sex marriage. 94 The subse
quent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidating such bans

confirms the difficulty of identifying plausible state interests other than
1
moral disapproval that would justify treating gays and straights differently. 50

145.
Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 3 10, 3 14-15 (2002) (majority opinion joined
by O'Connor, J. and Kennedy, J.) (holding unconstitutional the execution of the mentally retarded,
partly on the basis of "the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape that has occurred in the . .
13 years [since Penry]") with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 ( 1 989) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Kennedy, J.) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the execution of the mentally retarded partly
because "there is insufficient evidence of . . . a consensus today" against the practice).
.

146.
On abortion, compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion), with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 452 U.S. 450
( 1 989). On affirmative action, compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which apparently
upheld affirmative action in law school admissions partly because the practice was endorsed by
leading societal institutions such as the military and Fortune 500 companies, with Adarand Con
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200 ( 1 995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plural
ity opinion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 1 49, 196 ( 1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); and
"Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 ( 1 986), all of which invalidated affirmative
plans or at least subjected them to rigorous scrutiny.
147.
Robert P. George & David L. Tubbs, Why We Need a Marriage Amendment, CITY J.,
Autumn 2004, at 48 (noting that the Court may be reluctant to impose same-sex marriage now but
that eventually it "is almost certain to nationalize the issue and make same-sex-marriage legal from
coast to coast").
148.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 601
(noting that Justice O'Connor's Equal Protection rationale "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state
laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples").
149.

See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 72.

1 50.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court in Good
ridge rejected three interests proffered by the state to justify denying marriage to same-sex couples:
( ! ) creating a favorable setting for procreation; (2) ensuring that childrearing take place in "optimal"
settings; (3) saving state resources by limiting the scope of the marriage "subsidy."
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Scalia is surely right as a doctrinal matter but just as surely wrong as a
practical matter (as he undoubtedly appreciates). Five members of this Court

are not about to strike down any time soon bans on same-sex marriage-not
1 1
when public opinion strongly supports such laws. 5 Figuring out how the

Court in such a case would distinguish Lawrence is an interesting ques
1
tion. 52 Perhaps the Court would simply refuse to take such a case, much as
the Justices after Brown managed to evade the antimiscegenation issue in
Naim. 153 Alternatively, the Justices might adopt the unorthodox strategy pur
154
sued by Justice Kennedy in Romer v. Evans
and pretend that Lawrence
never happened, much as Romer fails even to acknowledge the existence of
Bowers. Regardless of whether they choose to ignore or to distinguish Law
rence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are not about to create a
constitutional right for gays to marry in light of contemporary public opin
ion.

Yet the Court's refusal after Brown to extend its antidiscrimination ra

tionale to the logical conclusion of invalidating antimiscegenation laws

lasted only as long as public opinion remained overwhelmingly hostile to
interracial marriage. The same is likely to be true of same-sex marriage. If

public opinion on that issue becomes more tolerant-as I suggest below is
1
almost certain to happen 55-then the Court is likely to extend Lawrence's

condemnation of "moral disapproval" of homosexuality and invalidate bans
1
on same-sex marriage. 56 The critical development in both arenas will have
been changes in public opinion, not the inexorable doctrinal logic of the

earlier decision.
IV. CONSEQUENCES
Scholars have long disagreed about how consequential Supreme Court
1
rulings tend to be. 57 Some have argued that such decisions make little if any
151.
See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, The Supreme Court Ruled for Privacy-Not for Gay Mar
riage, 35 NAT ' L J. 2402, 2402-03 (JULY 26, 2003) (noting that this conservative Supreme Court is
not going to "ram same-sex marriage down the throat of an unwilling public").
1 52.
See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 72 (speculating that the Court would distinguish same
sex marriage from Lawrence on the ground that public opinion still strongly supports the traditional
definition of marriage).
1 53.
Cf Lofton v. Sec' y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (I I th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); Charles Lane, Gay-Adoption Ban in Florida to Stand,
WASH. PoST, Jan. 1 1 , 2005, at A4 (noting the Court's refusal to hear a challenge to Florida's unique
statute banning adoptions by gays and suggesting that this action "may signal the Court's reluctance
to move into a potentially charged area").
1 54.

5 1 7 U.S. 620 ( 1 996).

1 55.

See infra notes 381-392 and accompanying text.

1 56.
Cf Sunstein, supra note 52, at 31 ('The Supreme Court may or may not read Lawrence
to require states to recognize gay and lesbian marriages. But if and when it does so, i t will be fol
lowing public opinion, not leading it.").
1 57.
For scholarship, much of it by political scientists, examining the impact of Supreme
Court decisions, see, for example, KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL
PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 133-53 (197 1 ) ; JOEL F. HANDLER,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE
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difference, while others have claimed that they can be of enormous impor

tance. In the race context, for example, we hear at one end of the spectrum

that Brown v. Board of Education created the civil rights movement and, at
1
the other, that it had no impact whatsoever. 58 Examining the consequences
of Brown and Lawrence illustrates the unpredictable, and occasionally per
verse, consequences of Supreme Court rulings. 159
A. Brown 's Backlash

Brown produced very little school desegregation in the South for nearly

a decade, as white southerners launched a campaign of massive resistance
160
that proved largely successful.
But Brown had other, less direct conse

quences. The Court's ruling dramatically raised the salience of the segregation
11
issue, forcing many people to take a position for the first time. 6 Brown was

also enormously symbolic to African Americans, many of whom regarded it
1
as the greatest victory for their race since the Emancipation Proclamation. 62

In addition, Brown inspired southern blacks to file petitions and lawsuits

challenging school segregation, including in dozens of localities in the Deep

1 92-209 (1978); LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David
A. Schultz ed,, 1998); ROSENBERG, supra note 68; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 8, at 333-55;
STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES
( 1 970); Michael W. McCann, Refonn Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 7 1 5 ( 1 992);

Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Refonn, 102 YALE L.J. 1 763 (1993).
1 58.
On the importance of Brown specifically, compare ROSENBERG, supra note 68, at 7 1 ,
169, 338, and Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to
Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REv. 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 (1 994), which deny that Brown had any significant posi
tive impact on the movement for racial equality, with JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 1 2,
1 1 6 ( 1 994), and Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1 1 1 7, 1 1 1 8 ( 1 99 1 ), which argue that
Brown was instrumental to the modem civil rights movement. For other extravagant assessments of
Brown's importance, see DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION
OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 25 ( 1 995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PuRSUIT OF JUSTICE 15 ( 1 998); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM Brown TO Bakke: THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 6 ( 1 979); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 6 1 , 62 ( 1 988); and Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Histori
cal Context: In Defense of Brown, 1 1 8 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973-74, 976, 1 006-07, 1 0 1 7, 1029
(2005). For a more measured assessment, see Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of
Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 693, 1 708-12 (2004), which agrees with Rosenberg that the contribu
tion of Brown to the transformation of U.S. race relations "is easily exaggerated" but nonetheless
concludes that the Supreme Court might have played an important role in articulating the principles
of New Deal liberalism. For my own views on this subject, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , ch. 7.
1 59.
On the idea of backlash generally, see Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 75 1
( 1 989); Friedman, Importance of Being Positive, supra note 69, at 1 29 1 -93; and Michael J. Klar
man, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, J. AM. HlsT., June 1 994, at 8 1 .
160.

O n massive resistance, see generally NUMAN v. BARTLEY, THE RISE O F MASSIVE RESIS

TANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's ( 1 969), and NEIL R. MCMILLEN,
THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-62
( 1 97 1 ) . On the lack of desegregation in the first decade, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 344-63.

161.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 364-65.

1 62.

Id. at 369.
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South, where such challenges would otherwise have been inconceivable in
63

the mid- 1 950s. 1

Yet Brown may have mattered even more in another way. B y the early
1 960s, a powerful direct-action protest movement had exploded in the
South, featuring sit-ins, freedom rides, and street demonstrations. Brown
helped to ensure that when such demonstrations came, politicians such as
Bull Connor and George Wal lace were there to meet them with violence.

That brutality, when vividly communicated to national audiences by televi
sion, mobilized public opinion in support of transformative civil rights
legislation. 1 64

In the short term, Brown retarded progressive racial reform in the South.
With school desegregation lurking in the background, whites in the Deep
South suddenly could no longer tolerate black voting. Significant postwar

expansions of black suffrap in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana were
halted and then reversed. 1 6 Brown also retarded the pace of university de
segregation, which had been proceeding slowly but surely under the Court's
1 950 ruling in Sweatt v . Painter.

166

The post-Brown backlash in the South

also reversed progress in desegregating sporting competitions, including
minor league baseball and intercollegiate football and basketball. 1 67 Even

minor interracial courtesies and interactions that were uncontroversial be
fore 1 954 often had to be suspended in the post-Brown racial hysteria. In

1 959 Governor John Patterson of Alabama barred black marching bands

from the inaugural parade, where they had previously been warmly re
6
ceived. 1 8 Since its founding in 1 942, Koinonia Farm, an interracial religious

cooperative in Americus, Georgia, had experienced little harassment, but
after Brown its products were boycotted and its roadside produce stands

were shot at. Interracial unions that had thrived in the South for years self
destructed after Brown.

169

Most importantly, in the wake of Brown, political contests in southern
states assumed a common pattern: Candidates maneuvered against one an
other to occupy the most extreme point on the segregationist spectrum.
Racial moderates, who denounced diehard resistance to Brown, were labeled
"double crossers," "sugar-coated integrationists," "cowards," and "trai

tors." 1 10 Most moderates either joined the segregationist bandwagon, or they

were retired from service. A Virginia politician observed that it "would be

163.

Id. at 368-69.

1 64.

For a more detailed exegesis of this backlash argument, see id. at 385-442.

165.

Id. at 392-93.

166.

339 U.S. 629 (1950); see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 393.

167.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 393-94.

168.
Patterson Inaugurated with Pledge to Continue Separation of State Schools, So. ScH.
NEWS (Nashville), Feb. 1959, at 16.
169.
Margaret Price, Draft of Joint Interagency Fact Finding Project on Violence and Intimi
dation 5 1-52, microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 1 1 , frames 388-89 (Univ. Publ'ns
of Am.).
1 70.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 391 (citations omitted).
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suicide to run on any other platform [than segregation] ." 1 1 1 A liberal southern
editor explained that "it takes guts NOT to come out for segregation every
,, 2
day. 1 1
Although most southern politicians avoided explicit exhortations to vio

lence, the extremist rhetoric they used probably encouraged it. Marvin
Griffin, the Democratic nominee for governor of Georgia, condemned vio
lence but also insisted that "no true Southerner feels morally obliged to
recognize the legality of this act of tyranny [Brown] ." 1 13 Senator James East
land of Mississippi cautioned that "[a]cts of violence and lawlessness have
no place," but only after he had incited his audience with reminders that
"[t]here is no law that a free people must submit to a flagrant invasion of
their personal liberty" and that "[n]o people in all the history of Government
7
have been forced to integrate against their will." 1 4 Congressman James
Davis of Georgia insisted that "[t]here is no place for violence or lawless
m
acts,"
but only after he had called Brown "a monumental fraud which is
shocking, outrageous and reprehensible," warned against "meekly ac
cept[ing] this brazen usurpation of power," and denied any obligation on
76
"the people to bow the neck to this new form of tyranny." 1 These politi
cians either knew that such rhetoric was likely to incite violence, or they
were criminally negligent for not knowing it.

The linkage between particular public officials who benefited from the

post-Brown political backlash and the brutality that inspired civil rights leg

islation is compelling. T. Eugene ("Bull") Connor had been on the
Birmingham City Commission since 1 937. But in the early 1 950s, civic

leaders, who had come to regard him as an embarrassment because of his
extremism and frequent brutality toward blacks, orchestrated his public hu
miliation through an illicit sexual encounter. Connor retired from public life
in 1 953, and racial progress ensued in Birmingham, including the estab

lishment of the first hospital for blacks, the desegregation of elevators in

downtown office buildings, and serious efforts to desegregate the police
force.1 77

After Brown, Birmingham's racial progress ground to a halt, and Connor
resurrected his political career. In 1 957 he regained his city commission
seat, defeating an incumbent he attacked as weak on segregation. In the late
17 I .
Virginia's Pupil Placement Act Is Under Challenge in Two Courts, So. ScH. NEWS
(Nashville), July 1957, at 3.
172.
Stan Opotowsky, Dixie Dynamite: The Inside Story of the White Citizens' Councils 18
(Jan. 1957), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 13, frames 670, 685 (Univ. Publ'ns
of Am.).
173.

Georgia, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 4, 1954, at 10.

174.

Sen. James Eastland, The South Will Fight!, ARK. FAITH, Dec. 1955, at 8-9, microformed
on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 1 3, frames 303-04 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am).

1 75. Speech of Hon. James C. Davis of Georgia, in Defense of Constitutional Government,
and State Sovereignty, Delivered at West Memphis, Ark. (Mar. 31, 1956), reprinted in I 02 CONG.
REC. 5, 6825 (1956).
1 76.

Id. at 6822.

1 77.

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 429-30 (citing relevant sources).
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1 950s, a powerful Klan element wreaked havoc in Birmingham with a wave
of unsolved bombings and brutality. The police, under Connor's control,
declined to interfere. Standing for reelection in 1 96 1 , Connor cultivated ex
tremists by offering the Ku Klux Klan fifteen minutes of "open season" on
the Freedom Riders as they rolled into town. Connor won in a landslide. 178
In 1 963 the Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC") was
searching for a southern city with a police chief whose violent propensities

could be counted on to produce televised scenes of police brutality against
peaceful demonstrators that would shock the nation's conscience. They se
lected Birmingham because of Connor. The strategy worked brilliantly, as
Connor soon unleashed police dogs and fire hoses against the demonstra

tors, many of whom were children. The national news media featured
images of police dogs attacking unresisting demonstrators, including one
that President John F. Kennedy reported made him sick. Editorials con

demned the violence as a national disgrace. Citizens voiced their outrage
and demanded that politicians take action to immediately end such savagery.
Within ten weeks, spin-off demonstrations had spread to over 1 00 cities. 179

These televised scenes of brutality dramatically altered northern opinion

on race and enabled passage of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act. Opinion polls
revealed that the percentage of Americans who deemed civil rights the na

tion's most urgent issue rose from four percent before Birmingham to fifty
two percent after. 1 80 Only after B irmingham did Kennedy announce on na
tional television that civil rights was a moral issue "as old as the scriptures
and . . . as clear as the American Constitution"1 8 1 and propose landmark civil
rights legislation that would end Jim Crow. 1 82
Even more than Connor, Governor George Wallace of Alabama personi
fied the post-Brown racial fanaticism of southern politics. Early in his
postwar political career, Wallace had been criticized as soft on segregation.

By the mid- 1 950s, though, Wallace had felt the shifting political winds and

become an ardent segregationist. In 1 958, Wallace's principal opponent in
the Alabama governor's race, state attorney general John Patterson, received
an endorsement from the Ku Klux Klan. Wallace criticized Patterson for not

repudiating this endorsement, which unwittingly made him the candidate of
moderation. Patterson easily defeated Wallace, leaving the latter to ruminate
that "no other son-of-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me again." 1 83

Wallace made good on that promise in 1 962, winning on a campaign
promise of defying federal integration orders, "even to the point of standing

178.

For this paragraph, see id. at 430-3 1 (citing relevant sources).

1 79.

For this paragraph, see id. at 433-36 (citing relevant sources).

1 80.

3 GALLUP, supra note 8 1 , at 1 8 12, 1 842.

181.

CARL M . BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 260 ( 1 977)

(quoting Kennedy).

1 82.

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 435-36 (citing relevant sources).

1 83 .
DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS O F RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS O F THE NEW
CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 96 (1995) (footnote omitted).
For this paragraph generally, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 399, 436-37 (citing relevant sources).
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He declared in his inaugural address:

"In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the
line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say seg
18
regation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." 5

In the summer of 1 963, Wallace fulfilled his campaign pledge to stand in
the schoolhouse door at Tuscaloosa, physically blocking the university's

entrance before, in a carefully planned charade, stepping aside in the face of

superior federal force. That September, Wallace used state troops to block
the court-ordered desegregation of public schools in Birmingham, Mobile,

and Tuskegee, and he encouraged local extremists to wage a boisterous
1
campaign against desegregation. 86

Threatened with judicial contempt citations, Wallace eventually relented.

The schools desegregated, but within a week tragedy had struck. Birming

ham Klansmen, possibly inspired by the governor's protestations that "I
1 7
can't fight federal bayonets with my bare hands," 8 dynamited the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church, killing four black schoolgirls. Within hours of the

bombing, two other black teenagers were killed. It was the largest death toll
188
of the civil rights era, and Wallace received much of the blame.
Most of the nation was appalled by the murder of innocent schoolchil

dren. One week after the bombing, tens of thousands of Americans

participated in memorial services and marches. Northern whites wrote to the

NAACP to join, to condemn, and to apologize. A white lawyer from Los

Angeles wrote that "[t]oday I am joining the NAACP; partly, I think, as a

kind of apology for being caucasian, and for not being in Birmingham to
1 9
lend my physical support." 8 A white teenager from New Rochelle wrote:
"How shall I start? Perhaps to say that I am white, sorry, ashamed, and
guilty. . . . Those who have said that all whites who, through hatred, intoler
190
The NAACP urged its members

ance, or just inaction are guilty are right."

to "flood Congress with letters in support of necessary civil rights legisla
191

tion to curb such outrages."

Early in 1965, the SCLC brought its voter registration campaign to

Selma, Alabama, in search of another Birmingham-style victory. King and

his colleagues chose Selma partly because of the presence there of a law

1 84.
Ribicoff Proposal on Impact Aid Alarms Alabama Educators, So. ScH. NEWS (Nash
ville), Apr. 1962, at 3.
1 85.
Gov. Wallace Reaffirms Intent to Keep Segregation, So. ScH. NEWS (Nashville), Feb.
1963, at 10.
1 86.

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 437 (citing relevant sources).

1 87.

CARTER, supra note 1 83, at 1 73 (quoting George Wallace).

1 88.

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 437-38 (citing relevant sources).

1 89.
Letter from Donald B . Brown to Roy Wilkins, National Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 1 8,
1963), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 941 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.).
190.

Letter from Robert E. Feir to Roy Wilkins, National Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 23, 1963),

microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 959 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.).
191.
Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Units Hold Services for Birmingham Bomb Victims
(Sept. 2 1 , 1963), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, pt. 20, reel 3, frame 986 (Univ. Publ'ns of
Am.).
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enforcement officer of Bull Connor-like proclivities. Dallas County Sheriff
Jim Clark had a vicious temper, especially when it came to black people
19
asserting their civil rights. 2
Selma proved another resounding success (albeit a tragic one) for the

civil rights movement, as Clark could not restrain himself from brutalizing

peaceful demonstrators. The violence culminated in Bloody Sunday, March

7, 1 965, when county and state law enforcement officers viciously assaulted

marchers as they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge on the way to Mont
gomery. Governor Wallace had promised that the march would be broken up
193
by "whatever measures are necessary."
That evening, ABC television in
terrupted its broadcast of Judgment at Nuremberg for a lengthy film report

of peaceful demonstrators being assailed by stampeding horses, flailing
194
clubs, and tear gas.
Most of the nation was repulsed by the ghastly scenes they had watched

on television. Time reported that "[r]arely in history has public opinion re
19
acted so spontaneously and with such fury." 5 Over the following week,
huge sympathy demonstrations took place across the country, and hundreds

of clergymen flocked to Selma to show their solidarity with King and his
comrades. U.S. citizens demanded remedial action from their congressmen,

scores of whom condemned the "deplorable" violence and the "shameful
19
display" of Selma and endorsed voting rights legislation. 6 On March 1 5 ,

1 965, President Johnson proposed such legislation before a joint session of

Congress. Seventy million Americans watched on television as the president

beseeched them to "overcome this crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice"
197
and declared his faith that "we shall overcome."
It was the brutalization of peaceful black demonstrators by white law

enforcement officers in the South that repulsed national opinion and led di

rectly to the passage of landmark civil rights legislation. The post Brown
-

fanaticism of southern politics created a situation that was ripe for violence.

Much of that violence was encouraged, directly or indirectly, by extremist
politicians, whom voters rewarded for the irresponsible rhetoric that fo

mented brutality. By helping to lay bare the violence at the core of white
.
. 198
supremacy, Brown acce 1erated its d emise.
1 92.

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 440 (citing relevant sources).

STEPHEN L. LONGNECKER, SELMA'S PEACEMAKER: RALPH SMELTZER AND CIVIL RIGHTS
1 93 .
MEDIATION 1 76 ( 1 987) (quoting George Wallace); see also CARTER, supra note 1 83, at 249 (noting
that Wallace's chief law enforcement lieutenant i nsisted that the governor himself had ordered the
use of force) .

1 94 .

For this paragraph, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , a t 440-41 (citing relevant sources) .

1 95.

The Nation: Civil Rights, nME, Mar. 1 9, 1 965, at 23, 24.

1 96.

1 1 1 CONG. REc. 4984-89, 50 1 4- 1 5 ( 1 965).

1 97 .
Lyndon B . Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (Mar. 1 5,
1 965), in 1 PuBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JoHNSON 28 1 ,
284 ( 1 966). For this paragraph generally, see KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , a t 440-4 1 (citing relevant
s ources).
1 98 .
See generally KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 385-442 (describing Brown's backlash, the
violence it fostered, and the counterbacklash that the vi olence incited).
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B. The Backlash Against Same-Sex Marriage
It is, of course, too soon to tell what the broader impact of Lawrence
will be. One might have predicted a fairly mild reaction to a ruling that in

validated criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy, given that such statutes
99
were almost never enforced anyway. 1 Yet the response to Lawrence quickly
200
Both sides of the gay-rights debate apparently ap
became acrimonious.

preciated that the decision would have little practical significance when

considered narrowly, and thus they shifted their attention to far more con
201
troversial issues like same-sex marriage.
Justice Scalia's dissent in

Lawrence, which insisted that the majority' s rationale for invalidating
Texas's ban on same-sex sodomy would logically entail a constitutional
right for gays to marry, was widely circulated in conservative Christian cir
202
At the same time, well-publicized developments in Canada
cles.
including both legislative and judicial recognition of same-sex marital
0
rights2 3-made the issue of same-sex marriage concrete and "sent shock

waves through the religious right," according to one prominent social con
04
servative.2
Critics of same-sex marriage in the United States viewed
developments in Canada as a wakeup call. Ken Connor, president of the

199. See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 556 (noting, with regard to Lawrence, that one
is not likely "to see anything like the intense political opposition generated by this decision's most
important doctrinal ancestor, Roe v. Wade"); id. ("most of the public can be counted on to respond to
the immediate consequences of Lawrence with a yawn").
200. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003,
(Magazine), at 48 (describing how social conservatives swiftly mobilized opposition to Lawrence);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Avoids Stand on Gay Marriage Measure, N.Y. TIME S , July 2,
2003, at A22 (noting that conservatives were "outraged" over Lawrence); Thomas, supra note 2
(describing conservative groups as "apoplectic" over Lawrence).
20 1 . Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and Fight: Don't Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, NAT't. REV.,
July 28, 2003, at 26-28 (warning after Lawrence that "next season may be the last, at least for mar
riage"); Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-By-State Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, at AS (noting that in the wake of Lawrence, both sides in the gay-rights debate were "vowing
an intense state-by-state fight over deeply polarizing questions, foremost among them whether gays
should be allowed to marry"); Rosen, supra note 200 (noting that liberal activists and social conser
vatives both thought that Lawrence "made it more likely that lower courts will come to recognize a
constitutional right to gay marriage"); William Satire, Op-Ed, The Bedroom Door, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2003, at A21 (predicting immediately after Lawrence that gay-rights activists would tum same
sex marriage into a dominant political issue).
202. Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege is Fueling a Resurgence, NATION,
July 5, 2004, at 33; Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BOSTON Gt.OBE, Sept.
28, 2003, at A l .
203. See Halpern v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 6 5 O.R.3d 1 6 1 (Ont. C.A. 2003); Tom Cohen, Doz
ens in Canada Follow Gay Couple 's Lead, WASH. PoST, June 1 2, 2003, at A25; Clifford Krauss,
Canadian Leaders Agree to Propose Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 8, 2003, at A l ; see also
Clifford Krauss, Canada's Supreme Coun Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec . 10, 2004, at A7 (noting that in Canada the high courts of six provinces and one territory, which
together comprise eighty-five percent of the country's population, have ruled unconstitutional the
traditional definition of marriage).

204. Kaplan, supra note 202 (quoting Phil B urress, president of Citizens for Community
Values in Ohio); see also Clifford Krauss, A Few Gay Americans Tie the Knot in Canada, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A2 (noting that the Canadian court decisions, together with Lawrence,
encouraged the belief among gay-rights groups that barriers to same-sex marriage in the United
States were vulnerable).
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Family Research Council, declared, "[u]nless the American people rise up to
defend this indispensable institution, we could lose marriage in a very short
time."205 James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, warned in a news
letter in September 2003, "the homosexual activist movement . . . is poised
to administer a devastating and potentially fatal blow to the traditional fam
ily."206 Reverend Jerry Falwell, leader of the now-defunct Moral Majority,
and Tony Perkins, incoming president of the Family Research Council, both
announced that they were shifting their attention to the marriage issue and
committing their full support to the federal marriage amendment. 207 The
Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution condemning same-sex un
ions, and the leadership of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
endorsed a federal constitutional amendment to ban them.208 The chairman
of the Republican National Committee, Ed Gillespie, stated for the first time
that the Republican party platform in 2004 might support a federal marriage
amendment. 209
Then, in November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in
210
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that a state law limiting mar
riage to a union of a man and a woman violated the equality provision of the
state constitution. A similar ruling in 1 993 by the Hawaii Supreme Court2 1 1
had provoked a dramatic political backlash. Within a few years, more than
thirty states (including Hawaii) and Congress had responded by passing De
fense of Marriage Acts. 2 1 2
Almost immediately after Goodridge, President George W. Bush stated
that he would "do what is legally necessary to defend the sanctity of mar
riage."2 1 3 Many Republican congressional representatives and conservative
activists went further, demanding a federal constitutional amendment to ex
plicitly bar same-sex marriage. 2 14 Referring to the Massachusetts ruling, a
Wisconsin woman warned in the newsletter of Focus on the Family, "Soon
all of the U.S. will become Sodom and Gomorrah."2 15 James Dobson wrote
that the fight against gay marriage would be "our D-day, or Gettysburg or

205.
Christopher Marquis, U.S. Gays Who Marry in Canada Face Hurdles, N. Y. TIMES, June
1 9, 2003, atA8.
206.

Leonard, supra note 202.

207.

Id.

208.

Id.

209.

Id.

2 1 0.

798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

211.

B aehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

2 1 2.
These laws are listed in EsKRIOOE, supra note 85, app. B3; see also RIMMERMAN, supra
note 9 1 , at 75 (describing an "enormous conservative backlash" against Baehr).
2 1 3.
Howard Fineman & T. Trent Gegax, 'My Mommies Can Marry,' NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1 ,
2003, at 34; Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A29.
2 1 4.

Maggie Gallagher, Massachusetts v. Marriage, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. I, 2003, at 2 1 , 2 1 .

2 1 5.

Kaplan, supra note 202.
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Within a week, representatives of several conservative groups

met in Washington, D.C., to plan a national strategy to counter the ruling,
21
including demands for a federal marriage amendment. 7 The president of
Concerned Women of America, Sandy Rios, declared that her group would
use the amendment "as a litmus test for offices from president to street
sweeper," and she warned that if President Bush did not support such an

amendment, some evangelicals and Roman Catholics would withhold their
21
votes in the 2004 presidential election. 8 The Traditional Values Coalition
began sending 1 .5 million mailings a month to prospective voters to rally
219
support for the marriage amendment. Many commentators noted that the
same-sex marriage issue had quickly supplanted abortion as the principal
220
concern of social and religious conservatives.

Political analysts now predicted that the same-sex marriage issue would
221
and that it
"resonate for months and months during the election season"
222
would be "front and center of the 2004 debate." Most recognized that the

issue was "a real gift" for social conservatives, because "it's revitalized their
22
base and revitalized their fund-raising." 3 One top advisor to a Democratic
presidential candidate said, "I got a bad case of acid reflux as soon as I
heard about it," and a pair of political reporters observed that the decision
224
"complicates life for the leading Democratic candidates."

Goodridge mandated that same-sex couples be allowed to marry-a
position that had not carried the day in the popularly elected branches of a
single state government and that opinion polls showed was rejected by

2 1 6.

Id.

2 1 7.

Seelye, supra note 2 1 3.

Id. ; see also Fineman & Gegax, supra note 2 1 3 (quoting Gary Bauer of the organization
2 1 8.
American Values, "People would stay home if they thought the party they were investing in wasn't
willing to go to the mat on this").
219.

Kaplan, supra note 202.

220.

Leonard, supra note 202; Seelye, supra note 2 1 3 .

22 1 .
at 24.

James Dao, State Action is Pursued on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004,

222.
Morning Edition (Nat'! Pub. Radio broadcast Dec. 26, 2003) (quoting Republican poll
ster Bill Mcinturff); see also id. (noting that same-sex marriage "will likely be one of the most
contentious social issues in the 2004 races").
223.
Kaplan, supra note 202 (quoting Jean Hardisty, founder of Political Research Associates,
a group that researches the far right); see Andrew Jacobs, Black Legislators Stall Marriage Amend
ment in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at 1 1 (reporting leaders of the Georgia Legislative Black
Caucus predicting that if a state constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage got on the
ballot that fall, Republicans might take over the lower house of the state legislature); Rosen, supra
note 200 ("If any single Supreme Court decision can reinvigorate the culture wars today, conserva
tives say, the court has just handed it to them on a silver platter."); Robin Toner, Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A l (quoting conservative leader Gary Bauer stating that on the issue of
same-sex marriage, "[t]he public overwhelmingly embraces . . . the conservative side"); Morning
Edition, supra note 222, (quoting Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg observing that same-sex
marriage "has the potential to be a wedge issue [with] . . . greater risk for the Democrats").
224.
Fineman & Gegax, supra note 2 1 3; see also Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 4 1 ,
at 19 (calling Goodridge "politically naive" and predicting that i t will produce a powerful backlash).

Michigan Law Review

462

[Vol. 104:43 1

national majorities of roughly two to one. 225 Although many liberal Democ
rats

support

same-sex

marriage,

other

traditionally

Democratic

constituencies-African Americans, the elderly, the working class-generally
6
do not. 22 Many Democratic politicians-in the Massachusetts legislature, on

the presidential campaign trail, and elsewhere-tried to finesse the issue by

emphasizing their support for civil unions, while opposing same-sex mar
riage. 227 But opinion polls conducted soon after the Massachusetts ruling

showed that respondents were much more likely to vote for President Bush

than the as-yet undetermined nominee of the Democratic party after being
8
told of their respective positions on same-sex marriage and civil unions. 22
Polls also revealed that when people were read a Democratic statement of

support for civil unions and a Republican statement of opposition to same
sex marriage, they overwhelmingly favored the latter position, suggesting

that the Democrats' preferred strategy of diverting attention from marriage
9
to civil unions might not succeed. 22

In February and March of 2004, roughly 4,000 same-sex couples applied

for and received marriage licenses in San Francisco, where Mayor Gavin

Newsom announced that the state law restricting marriage to unions be
tween men and women was, in his opinion, unconstitutional. 230 Same-sex
couples quickly followed suit in Multnomah County, Oregon (which in

cludes Portland), where more than 3,000 were married before a state court

stopped the process. Smaller numbers of same-sex couples received mar-

225.
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2004, at A l (noting an opinion poll taken on February 16-17, 2004 revealing sixty-four percent
opposing same-sex marriage); Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (noting another poll showing that
respondents opposed same-sex marriage by sixty-one percent to thirty-four percent).
226.
See, e.g., David Mattson, The Struggle to Redefine Marriage, NATI ON , Aug. 1 8, 2003, at
30 (noting that sixty-three percent of blacks and Hispanics, ordinarily Democratic constituencies,
supported a federal marriage amendment); State ofthe Union, THE EcoNOMIST, Nov. 22, 2003, at 30
(noting that same-sex marriage "could provide Republicans with a powerful lever to pry away work
ing-class voters [who tend to be more culturally conservative] from the Democratic cause").
227.
Pam Belluck, Gays ' Victory Leaves Massachusetts Lawmakers Hesitant, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2003, at A29 (noting that the Massachusetts legislature was dominated by Democrats but
that many of them, especially those who were Catholic, supported civil unions but not same-sex
marriage); Duggan, supra note 88, at 14 (noting that most of the candidates for the Democratic
presidential nomination opposed same-sex marriage but supported civil unions).
228.
See NAT'L Pua. RA DIO , supra note 97, figs. 6, 23 (noting that respondents favored Presi
dent Bush over an unnamed Democratic nominee by forty-six percent to forty-two percent before
being informed of their respective positions on same-sex marriage and civil unions and by fifty-one
percent to thirty-five percent after).
229. Id. fig. 30 (noting that by fifty-five percent to thirty-three percent respondents identified
more closely with the Republicans' statement in opposition to same-sex marriage than with the
Democrats' statement in support of civil unions).
230.

Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Married 4,037 Same-Sex Pairs From 46 States, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A26. On August 1 2, 2004, the California Supreme Court ruled that the

marriage licenses issued by Mayor Newsom were "void and of no legal effect." Lockyer v. City and
County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004).
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riage licenses around the same time in Asbury Park, New Jersey,23 1 Sandoval
.
2
2
C ounty, New Mex1co, 32 and New Paltz, New York. 33

As photographs on the front pages of newspapers and film footage on

nightly television news programs showed scenes of gay and lesbian couples
celebrating their marriages outside of city halls across the country, social
conservatives began mobilizing support for state constitutional amendments
4
barring same-sex marriage.23 It was also at this time that President Bush

finally came out unequivocally in support of a federal marriage amend
2
ment. 35 According to the executive director of the Campaign for California
Families, "There are millions of Americans angry and disgusted by what
they see on the TV"; he called the issue, "the new civil war in America."236 A
leader of the Southern Baptist Convention observed, "I have never seen any
thing that has energized and provoked our grass roots like this issue [same
sex marriage] , including Roe v. Wade."

231

In Cincinnati, Ohio, a group called Citizens for Community Values be
gan

meeting

the

day

after

same-sex

couples

began

marrying

in

Massachusetts; its goal was to ensure that nothing similar would ever hap

pen in Ohio. The group collected over 500,000 signatures supporting a state
marriage amendment and registered over 54,000 new voters in the process.

The group's leader, Phil Burress, later reported, "[w]e would not have had
1 7 238
."
this on the ballot if they had not started marrying people on May
23 1 .
Thomas Crampton, Issuing Licenses, Quietly, to Couples in Asbury Park, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2004, at BS.
232.
Steve Barnes, New Mexico Gay-Marriage Injunction Stands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004,
at A I S (noting that the clerk in Sandoval County, New Mexico issued sixty-six marriage licenses to
same-sex couples before being enjoined by a court).
233.
Thomas Crampton, Spitzer and New Paltz Mayor Meet About Gay Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1 2, 2004, at B4 (noting that Mayor Jason West of New Paltz conducted marriages for
twenty-five gay couples before being enjoined by a court).
234.
See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 88 (reporting that the proposed federal marriage amendment
received a big boost last week when pictures of lesbians kissing their brides were broadcast around
the world); Dao, supra note 221 (noting that nearly two-dozen state legislatures were considering
constitutional amendments forbidding same-sex marriage and that the granting of marriage licenses
to same-sex couples in San Francisco was inspiring much of this activity); id. (noting a conservative
opponent of gay marriage making the point that "social conservatives had been particularly ener
gized by the spectacle of San Francisco officials granting marriage licenses to gay couples");
B arbara Kantrowitz, The New Face of Marriage, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1 , 2004, at 42 (noting that the
scenes of gays and lesbians marrying in San Francisco had been a provocative call to arms for con
servatives). But cf Balkin, supra note 69, at 1557 (predicting that the images of same-sex couples
getting married in San Francisco would play the same role for the gay-rights movement that the
televised images of Bull Connor attacking the black schoolchildren of Birmingham with fire hoses
and police dogs had for the civil rights movement).
235.
See, e.g., Bumiller, supra note 225; Duggan, supra note 88, at 14 (noting the political
storm over same-sex marriage intensifying as gay couples wed in San Francisco and President Bush
vowed to stop such marriages with a federal constitutional amendment).
236.

Kantrowitz, supra note 234.

237.
David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Using Issue of Gay Unions as a Rallying Tool, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at I ; see also id. (noting that the same-sex marriage issue was mobilizing social
conservatives in a way that no other issue had done in the last several years).
238.
Scott S. Greenberger, Gay-Marriage Ruling Pushed Voters, Mobilized Bush, Left Kerry
Wary, BOSTON GLOBE , Nov. 7, 2004, at B 1 .
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Burress also observed that in his twenty-one years of organizing, "I've never
seen anything like this . . . . It's a forest fire with a 1 00 mile-per-hour wind
behind it."239 The spokesman for the Defense of Marriage Coalition de
clared, "[p]eople are three times more passionate on this issue than they
were even about abortion."240 A leading gay-rights activist expressed concern
that the Massachusetts ruling was creating "a backlash so much more pow
erful than our community is prepared to handle."241 Also in May 2004,
Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin called same-sex marriage "an ideal
wedge issue," which would enable Republicans to peel away from the De
mocratic party such socially conservative groups as Catholics and African
Americans (whose support for same-sex marriage-at twenty-eight per
cent-was lower than among any other racial group). 242
The eventual presidential nominee of the Democratic party, Senator
John Kerry, was wary of the issue. He stated repeatedly-to the point of
obvious exasperation-that he supported civil unions, opposed same-sex
marriage, but also opposed the federal marriage amendment on the ground
that states should decide this issue for themselves.243 By contrast, President
Bush was now regularly calling for a federal amendment,244 and he was fre
quently referring to Kerry as the senator from Massachusetts-an obvious
effort to associate his opponent in voters' minds with that state's court decis1on protectmg same-sex marriage. 245
By the summer of 2004, political analysts were reporting that the presi
dent's reelection campaign had "finally hit on the issue they think may save
them in the 2 November election: same-sex marriage."246 Focus groups and
private polls suggested that Republicans could gain significant traction on
this issue with undecided voters as well as mobilize the party's conservative
Christian base. 247 Political analysts predicted that the issue of same-sex mar
riage could especially help Republicans in critical swing states such as
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio by turning out unusually large numbers
•

•

•

239.
James Dao, Flush with Victory, Grass-Roots Crusader Against Same-Sex Marriage
Thinks Big, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A28.
240.
Karen Breslau, A Rising Tide, Rocking Boats, The Politics of Gay Marriage Roil Ore
gon 's Electoral Terrain, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 43, 43 (quoting Tim NashiO.
24 1 .
Force).

Cloud, supra note 8 8 (quoting Matt Foreman o f the National Gay and Lesbian Task

242.
Kaplan, supra note 202; accord Debra Rosenberg, Politics: A Gay-Marriage Wedge,
NEWSWEEK, June 28, 2004, at 8, 8.
243.
Andrew Stephen, Bush and Cheney Have Hit on the Issue They Believe Will Save Them
in the 2 November Election-Same-Sex Marriages-and They Are Determined to Use this Weapon,
NEW STATESMAN, July 26, 2004, at 1 3 , 1 3 .
244.
See, e.g. , Elisabeth B umiller, Bush Talks to a n Appreciative Catholic Crowd, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2004, at A 1 4 ; Rosenberg, supra note 242, at 8.
245.

Greenberger, supra note 238.

246.
Stephen, supra note 243; see also Andrew Sullivan, If at First You Don 't Succeed . . . ,
TIME, July 26, 2004, at 78, 78 (noting that the same-sex marriage issue "is an integral part of the
Bush re-election campaign").
247.

See Stephen, supra note 243.
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of socially conservative voters. 248 President Bush declared, "activist judges
and local officials in some parts of the country are not letting up in their
efforts to redefine marriage for the rest of America."249 Senator Rick Santo
rum of Pennsylvania, one of the leading advocates of the federal marriage
amendment, referred to the recent rash of same-sex marriages and declared,
"the future of our country hangs in the balance because the future of mar
riage hangs in the balance."250
In July, Republicans in the Senate forced a vote on the federal marriage
amendment. Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado, the main sponsor of the
amendment, declared, "There is a master plan out there from those who
want to destroy the institution of marriage."25 1 Senator Hatch of Utah said,
"We have had traditional marriage in this world for over 5,000 years . . . .
This is one of the most important debates in history."252 Senator Santorum
asked, "Isn't that the ultimate homeland security, standing up and defending
marriage?"253 James Dobson wrote to his followers, "Barring a miracle, the
family as it has been known for more than five millennia will crumble, pres
aging the fall of Western civilization itself."254 Though the amendment was
defeated on a procedural vote by fifty to forty-eight (suggesting it was some
nineteen votes shy of the two-thirds majority required to pass),255 it did force
Democratic senators to go on record in opposition. This almost certainly
harmed those, such as Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, who
were competing for reelection in states where polls showed overwhelming
public support for ballot initiatives defining marriage in traditional terms.256
In early August, voters in Missouri provided a glimpse of what might lie
ahead when they overwhelmingly endorsed a ballot initiative amending the
state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a

248.
See Fear the Counter-Attack, EcoNOMIST, Aug. 2 1 , 2004, at 26, 26 (predicting that evan
gelical Christians, who in Ohio account for a quarter of the electorate, might vote in unusually large
numbers to defeat same-sex marriage and, in the process, help to reelect Bush); Sarah Kershaw &
James Dao, Voters in 10 of 11 States Are Seen as Likely to Pass Bans of Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A 1 4 (noting supporters of the state amendments predicting that the ballot
initiatives would draw more conservatives to the polls and thus might prove critical to Bush in swing
states); David D. Kirkpatrick, Gay Marriage Becomes a Swing Issue with Pull, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2004, at A7 (noting Celinda Lake, a Democratic pollster who had worked for Human Rights Cam
paign, conceding that the same-sex marriage issue might help Bush win Ohio); Stephen, supra note
243, at 14.
249.

Stephen, supra note 243.

250.

Id.

25 1 .

Sullivan, supra note 246.

252.

1 50 CONG. REC . S79 1 2 (daily ed . July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum).

253.

Sullivan, supra note 246.

254.

Id.

255.

See Marriage Amendment May Rise Again, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Aug. 10, 2004, at JO.

256. See Rosenberg, supra note 242; see also 1 50 CONG. REc. S8077 (July 14, 2004) (state
ment of Sen. Leahy of Vermont) ("[T]he Senate leadership has decided that forcing a vote in relation
to the [Federal Marriage Amendment] will benefit the Republican party politically, from the race for
the White House to the Senate races.").
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woman. 257 Voter turnout far exceeded that of any primary election in Mis
souri over the last quarter-century, and the amendment passed with a
whopping seventy percent majority, far greater than even its proponents had
anticipated. 258 The Coalition to Protect Marriage in Missouri attributed the
impressive voter turnout to grassroots mobilizing efforts, including notes
posted on church bulletin boards and sermons given by preachers to their
congregations.259 Reacting to the result in Missouri, the leader of Citizens
for Community Values in Ohio said the same-sex marriage issue has
"brought the people of faith to the table like I have never seen before."260 In
September, the Republican party platform "strongly support[ed]" President
Bush's call for a constitutional amendment to protect marriage.261
In the end, the political backlash ignited by Lawrence-and, even more
so, by Goodridge-had several direct consequences. First, thirteen states
added to their constitutions language defining marriage as a union between a
man and a woman;262 before 2004, only four states had such provisions in
their constitutions. 263 In none of these thirteen states was the vote close, and
many gay-rights activists were stunned by the margins of defeat.264 In only
two states-Michigan and Oregon-did the initiatives win less than sixty
percent of the vote, and in many states they won approximately seventy-five
percent. 265 In Mississippi, the amendment passed with eighty-six percent of
the vote. 266 Had Lawrence and Goodridge not focused public attention on the
issue of same-sex marriage, none of these measures would likely have ap
peared on the ballot. Marriage rights will now be harder to secure for gays
and lesbians because state legislatures cannot provide them, and state courts
cannot interpret state constitutions to protect them.

257.
Monica Davey, Missourians Back Amendment Barring Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2004, at A l 3 [hereinafter Davey, Missourians Back Amendment] ; Monica Davey, Sharp Reactions
to Missouri 's Decisive Vote Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A l 7 [hereinafter
Davey, Sharp Reactions].
258.

Davey, Sharp Reactions, supra note 257.

259.

Id. ; Davey, Missourians Back Amendment, supra note 257.

260.

Davey, Sharp Reactions, supra note 257.

26 1 .
2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA
83, http://www.gop.cmn/media/2004platform.pdf ("We strongly support President Bush's call for a
Constitutional amendment that fully protects marriage, and we believe that neither federal nor state
judges nor bureaucrats should force states to recognize other living arrangements as equivalent to
marriage.").
262.
See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, How Lines of the Culture War Have Been Redrawn, CHRIS
TIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 2004, at I .
263.
See, e.g. , Cheryl Wetzstein, States Lining Up to Outlaw Same-Sex 'Marriage, ' WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A3.
264.
Kate Zemike, Groups Vow Not to Let Losses Dash Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2004, at A30; see also Kershaw & Dao, supra note 248 (noting five weeks before the election that
the marriage initiative in Oregon was too close to call and that the national field director for the
Human Rights Campaign stated, "we're feeling good about Oregon").
265.

See, e.g., Gina Piccalo, Union and Division, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at E2 1 .

266.

Id.
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Second, opposition to same-sex marriage mobilized conservative Chris
tians to tum out at the polls in 2004 in unprecedented numbers,267 leading
one social conservative to joke the day after the election that "President
Bush should send a bouquet of flowers" to the members of the Massachu
setts Supreme Court.268 In the words of one political analyst, the ballot
measures "appear to have acted as magnets for thousands of socially con
servative voters in rural and suburban communities who might not otherwise
9
have voted."26 The issue of same-sex marriage not only mobilized the Re
publican party's base, but it also acted as a "wedge" to dislodge traditionally
Democratic constituencies such as African Americans, the elderly, and
working-class Catholics-all of whom voted for President Bush in some
what larger percentages than they had for other Republican presidential
candidates in recent elections. 270 In exit polls, twenty-two percent of voters
identified "moral values" as their principal voting issue, and of that group,
nearly eighty percent supported President Bush.27 1 Same-sex marriage
along with abortion and stem-cell research-was widely deemed to be one
of the dominant moral issues in the campaign. 272
In closely divided states such as Ohio, the issue of same-sex marriage
may well have determined the outcome of the presidential election. 273 A
Democratic strategist in that state bluntly declared that if the marriage
amendment "had not been on the ballot, John Kerry would have won

267. See, e.g., James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at P4; Piccalo, supra note 265.
268.
Elizabeth Mehren, State Bans on Gay Marriage Galvanize Sides, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2004, at 1 1 (quoting Robert Knight, director of the Culture and Family Institute of Concerned
Women for America); see also Donna Britt, Gay Unions Put Kerry Campaign Asunder, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 5, 2004, at B l (observing that the issue of same-sex marriage sparked a firestorm that
helped consume Kerry's presidential hopes); Dana Hull, Gay-Marriage Opposition Seen as Factor
Aiding Bush, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2004, at 13A (quoting Richard Cizik, vice presi
dent for governmental affairs at the National Association of Evangelicals, "Five judges in
Massachusetts and the mayor of San Francisco may have done more to help George W. Bush's cam
paign then [sic] anything else"); Walter Shapiro, Presidential Election May Have Hinged on One
Issue: Issue /, USA TODAY, Nov. 5-7, 2004, at 6A (noting that Goodridge "may have been the
decisive factor in granting Bush a second term").
269.

Dao, supra note 267.

270. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4.
27 1 .

Id.

272.
See, e.g., Anthony B. Robinson, Making Sense of Moral Surprise During the 2004 Elec
tion, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 2004, at F l .
273.
See, e.g. , Editorial, Bigotry and Ballots: Gay Marriage Is Repudiated; So Is Faimess,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, at A 1 6 [hereinafter Bigotry and Ballots](noting that gay
marriage was high among the moral issues that concerned conservative voters, perhaps decisively in
states such as Ohio); Greenberger, supra note 238 (quoting Al Cross of the Institute for Rural Jour
nalism and Community Issues at the University of Kentucky, concluding that "there is plenty of
analytical and anecdotal evidence out there over the last couple of days that the Republicans hit the
jackpot with the rural folks in Ohio"); Andrew Sullivan, Uncivil Union, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22,
2004, at 1 1 (observing that the same-sex marriage issue may have proved critical to Bush's victory
in Ohio). But see Charles Krauthammer, 'Moral Values ' Myth, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 2004, at A25
(strongly rejecting the view that the issue of same-sex marriage was responsible for Bush's victory).
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Ohio."274 Many political analysts credited the ballot measure with spurring
Republican voter turnout in the socially conservative western and southern
portions of the state, thus offsetting the unusually high Democratic turnout
in cities such as Cleveland and Columbus.275 Without the electoral votes of
Ohio, President Bush would not have been reelected. In his second term, the
president is widely expected to appoint the sort of conservative judges and
Justices who will be least likely to extend Lawrence to protect other rights
of gays and lesbians. Indeed, within weeks of the election, the administra
tion-as an evident reward to social and religious conservatives for their
election-day accomplishments-announced that it was renominating ten of
the most controversial judicial selections from President Bush's first term,
whose confirmation Democratic senators had blocked through filibuster.276
Thus, the backlash ignited by Goodridge possibly ensured the reelection of
a president whose judicial appointments will almost certainly delay the legal
recognition of same-sex marriage. 277
Third, the issue of same-sex marriage clearly provided the margin of
victory for Republican senators in closely fought contests in states such as
Kentucky and South Dakota. In Kentucky, Senator Jim Bunning was nar
rowly reelected despite running an almost comically inept campaign against
an underfunded, relatively unknown opponent, Dr. Daniel Mongiardo.278 In
the state legislature, Mongiardo had cosponsored the amendment barring
same-sex marriage that appeared on the November ballot. But, with the con274.

Shapiro, supra note 268.

275. Dao, supra note 267; Frank Langfitt, For Most Voters, Values Trumped Terror and Taxes,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 2004, at I A; Joan Vennochi, Was Gay Marriage Kerry's Undoing?, BosTON
GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2004, at A I S ; see also Dao, supra (noting a political analyst in Michigan reporting
that his polls showed that five percent of voters said the ballot initiative on marriage was their main
motivation for voting).
276.
Eric Gorski, Dobson Shifts Power to Focus on the Politics, DENVER POST, Nov. 14, 2004,
at A l (noting James Dobson explaining that he took a higher profile in the 2004 election than previ
ously because he "had to do everything [he] could to keep the loony left from capturing the United
States Supreme Court" and declaring that "[f]or many social conservatives, judges are more to
blame than lawmakers for societal changes over the past 30 years"); Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries
Again on Court Choices Stalled in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at A l .
277.
See, e.g. , Mickey Wheatley, Op-Ed, For the Moment, Concentrate on Being Civil, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1 0, 2004, at B i l (noting that the same-sex marriage issue helped elect Bush and con
servative senators, whose victory will ensure the appointment of new Supreme Court Justices "likely
to adjudicate us right out of the constitution").
278.
John Cheves, Senate Race Should Please Republicans, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
May 9, 2004, at A l ("In recent months, Bunning has exhibited a pattern of putting his foot in his
mouth.").
Among other things, in February 2004, Bunning startled civic leaders in Louisville by stating
that a second new bridge that had been promised to the city would be delayed indefinitely because
northern Kentucky, where Bunning lives, needed a new bridge to Cincinnati. After the U.S. congres
sional representative from Louisville corrected Bunning, explaining that he was "confused,"
Bunning denied having made the remarks, despite a television news crew having them on tape. In
March, Bunning told an audience that his opponent, the olive-skinned son of Italian immigrants,
looked like the dead sons of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Mongiardo demanded an apol
ogy, but Bunning's campaign denied that he had made the remarks. After eyewitnesses publicly
confirmed the comments, campaign officials insisted that Bunning had been joking. As some critics
began raising questions about Bunning's judgment and mental soundness (he was 72 years old), his
campaign aides began steering him away from public speeches. Id.
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test unexpectedly tight in the final weeks, state Republican leaders cam
paigning with Bunning called Mongiardo, a 44-year-old bachelor, " 'limp
9
wristed' and a 'switch hitter.' "27 Republican state senator Elizabeth Tori
said that Mongiardo "is not a gentleman, . . . I'm not even sure the word
'man' applies to him."280 Reporters began asking Mongiardo if he was gay
(he firmly denied that he was).281 Late in the campaign, Republicans ran
commercials that featured the sound of wedding bells, a�ain hinting that
Mongiardo was weak on the issue of same-sex marriage. 28 Analysts attrib
uted Bunning's victory to a large turnout of conservative rural voters who
had been mobilized by the state ballot initiative.283 Because President Bush
enjoyed commanding leads in Kentucky opinion polls, many conservatives
might have stayed home were it not for this ballot initiative. A small reduc
tion in the turnout of such voters would have cost Bunning reelection.
In South Dakota, John Thune, an evangelical Christian who was chal
lenging Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle for his seat, made the same
sex marriage issue "the centerpiece of his campaign," according to one De
mocratic spokesman.284 With a marriage amendment on the ballot, Thune
crisscrossed the state warning that the "institution of marriage is under at
tack from extremist groups . . . . They have done it in Massachusetts and
they can do it here."285 Like most Democratic candidates for national office
in the 2004 election, Daschle opposed same-sex marriage but also criticized
8
the federal marriage amendment as too drastic a step.2 6 Thune and Republi
can Governor Mike Rounds pressed Daschle to explain why he opposed a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage that most South Dakotans
supported.287 The director of Concerned Women for America of South Da
kota warned that Daschle "has promised the homosexual lobby that he
would ensure the defeat of the Federal Marriage Amendment."288 James
279.
Sarah Vos, Mongiardo Has Come Far. Fast, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 30, 2004,
at A l ; Amanda York, Pols Lookfor Limp Wrists, KY. PosT, Oct. 30, 2004, at A 1 2.
280.
Bruce Schreiner, GOP's Comments 'Pure Lies,' Mongiardo Says, LEXINGTON HERALD
LEADER, Oct. 30, 2004, at 84.
28 1 .

Id. ; Vos, supra note 279.

282.
See Dao, supra note 267; see also Kershaw & Dao, supra note 248 (noting that the pro
posed state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage was so popular in Kentucky that
legislative candidates fought over who supported it first).
283.

Dao, supra note 267; Greenberger, supra note 238.

284.
Dirk Johnson & Debra Rosenberg, The Gay War Rolls On, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 2004, at
34, 34 (quoting Dan Pfeiffer).
285.
Id. (quoting John Thune); see also Denise Ross, Thune Calls for Ban on Gay Marriage,
RA PI D CITY J., July 9, 2004, available at http://rapidcityjournal.com/articles/2004/07/09/news/local/
news04.prt (quoting Thune stating that "[r]unaway courts are trampling the will of the majority in
this country and the laws in 42 states").
286.

Ross, supra note 285.

287.
Scott Waltman, Daschle Against Gay Marriage Amendment, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, Jul.
14, 2004, at 10, available at 2004 WL 80866264.
288.
Id. (quoting Linda Schauer); see also Gorski, supra note 276 (noting that Focus on the
Family Action ran a full page advertisement in South Dakota newspapers after Senator Daschle
blocked the federal amendment, which declared, "Shame on You, Senator Daschle").
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Dobson, Tony Perkins, and Gary B auer, head of American Values, came to
Sioux Falls and told a crowd of five thousand that if the institution of mar
289
riage was not defended from homosexual attack, "it's going to be gone."
They criticized Daschle for blocking the federal marriage amendment in the
Senate and the appointment of federal judges who would uphold school
prayer.290 In the end, Thune defeated Daschle by fifty-one percent to forty
nine percent, making Daschle the first party leader in the Senate to be de
feated in more than fifty years. The state marriage amendment passed by
roughly seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent. Its presence on the bal
lot probably rallied enough social conservatives and shifted the stance of
enough marginal voters to cost Daschle reelection.291
Thus, the backlash ignited by the issue of same-sex marriage probably
helped Republicans increase their majority in the Senate from fifty-one to
fifty-five, which will make it harder for Democrats to block the confirmation
of socially conservative judges. Moreover, socially conservative leaders
have already begun threatening to "put in the bull's-eye" several Democratic
senators from states whose electoral votes went to President Bush if they
continue to block the administration's conservative judicial nominees.292
Fourth and finally, the public's rejection of same-sex marriage in the
thirteen state ballot initiatives was so unequivocal-two-thirds of all voters
on these initiatives rejected same-sex marriage-that social conservatives
and Republicans are certain not to allow the issue to die.293 Many social con
servatives have claimed credit for reelecting the president, insisting that
their efforts to defend the traditional definition of marriage drew millions of
evangelical Christians to the polls and provided Bush's margin of victory. 294
These groups have already begun flexing their political muscles, promising
"a battle of enormous proportions from sea to shining sea" if the administra-

289.
Ben Shouse, Advocate Promotes Religious Stance, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.),
Oct. 5, 2004, at IB, available at 2004 WLNR 1 6352528 (quoting James Dobson).
290.

Id.

29 1 . See also David D. Kirkpatrick, Evangelical Leader Threatens to Use His Political Mus
cle Against Some Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I , 2005, at A J O (crediting social conservatives with
defeating Daschle in South Dakota).
292.

Id. (quoting James Dobson).

293.
Kelly Brewington, 70 Pastors Ready Fight Against Gay Marriage, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17,
2004, at l B (noting that opponents of same-sex marriage in Maryland twice failed in the last session
of the General Assembly to strengthen the statutory limitation on marriage to unions between a man
and a woman, but that the results of the recent election have inspired them to try again); Nina J.
Easton, Va. Focus of Battle Over Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2005, at A l (quoting
Robert H. Knight, director of the Culture & Family Institute, an arm of Concerned Women for
America, stating that "[t]he smashing election results on Nov. 2 have energized conservatives").
294. Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004,
at A39; Gorski, supra note 276 (quoting Dobson, "I'm confident President Bush knows who was
responsible for this election victory"); see also Chris L. Jenkins, Va. GOP Lawmakers Want
Amendment to Define Marriage, WASH. PosT, Jan. 1 1 , 2005, at B6 (noting that the victories on the
state ballot initiatives "have energized social conservatives across the country and are credited by
some with helping President Bush win reelection in November").
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tion does not nominate socially conservative judges. 293 Moreover, the issue
of same-sex marriage is very appealing to conservative politicians because
in virtually every state a clear majority opposes it; by contrast, on other so
cial issues, such as abortion and stem-cell research, religious conservatives
occupy minority positions.296 Conversely, the gay-marriage issue makes
most Democrats very uncomfortable, because they wish neither to support
same-sex marriage in defiance of the wishes of a clear majority nor to alien
ate a gay-rights constituency that leans strongly Democratic (and, one might
surmise, many Democratic politicians privately sympathize with supporters
.
) .297
of same-sex mamage
Pundits are already predicting that marriage initiatives will be on the
ballot in ten or twenty more states over the next few years. 298 In Tennessee in
2004, for example, the two houses of the legislature passed such a measure
by lopsided votes of eighty-six to five and twenty-eight to one, and they are
virtually certain to pass it again in 2005, which will put it on the ballot at the
next election. 299 Similarly, Republicans in Congress are certain to push for
another vote on the federal marriage amendment. 300 The day after the
295.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 237; see also Gorski, supra note 276 (noting Dobson warning
Republicans that they would "pay a severe price" in four years if they refused to consult with con
servative Christians who had returned them to power and concluding that "Dobson stands to be a
force during President Bush's second term"); Evelyn Nieves, Gay Rights Groups Map Common
Agenda, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2005, at A3 (noting that conservative religious groups are lobbying
hard for federal judges who will oppose same-sex marriage).
296. Linda Feldmann, How Lines of the Culture War Have Been Redrawn, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Nov. 1 5, 2004, at 1 ; Kaplan, supra note 202.
297.
See Easton, supra note 293 (noting the awkward position that proposed state marriage
amendments create for one Democratic presidential prospect, Mark Warner, the governor of Vir
ginia, and quoting a Republican state legislator who has been a leading proponent of such an
amendment, "Politicians love halfway houses . . . . But on this, there ain't no halfway house. War
ner's doing the John Kerry dance.").
298.
Brad Knickerbocker, Political Battles over Gay Marriage Still Spreading, CHRISTIAN
Sc1. MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2004, at l (noting that amendments to ban gay marriage are likely to be on
the ballot in at least a dozen more states in 2006); Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1 2, 2004, at A l 6 (reporting the views of Mathew Staver, president and
general counsel of Liberty Council, a public interest law firm representing religious causes); Nieves,
supra note 295 (noting that conservative groups are seeking marriage amendments in fifteen more
states); Wetzstein, supra note 263.
299. Wetzstein, supra note 263; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting that conservatives in
the Virginia legislature have proposed several versions of a marriage amendment and that one of
them is virtually certain to pass in 2005 and to appear on the ballot in 2006).
300. Rove Says Marriage Amendment on Bush 's Agenda, FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 8, 2004, avail
able at LEXIS, News Library, Cumews File (noting that Karl Rove stated that President Bush would
definitely use his second term to push for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage); see
also Nieves, supra note 295 (noting that since the election, conservatives in Congress have been
emboldened in their support of the federal marriage amendment).
Some doubt has arisen since the election over the White House's commitment to pushing such
an amendment in the near term. See Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Upsets Some Sup
poners, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 2005, at A l l (noting that President Bush came under fire from some
social conservatives for saying in a recent interview that he would not aggressively lobby the Senate
to pass a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, though the White House later
sought to clarify that the president remained as committed as ever to barring same-sex marriage);
see also Richard W. Stevenson, White House Again Backs Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2005, at A 1 5 (same).
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election, James Dobson, who had weekly strategy sessions with the presi
dent's top political advisor Karl Rove during the election, called for a
renewed push for the amendment.301 The amendment will pick up support
among newly elected senators and representatives, as some lawmakers feel
pressure from constituents as a result of the successful ballot initiatives. 302
Finally, in this changed political environment, it seems unlikely that many
state court judges will stick out their necks by duplicating the adventurous
holding of the Massachusetts high court in Goodridge.303
Indeed, some gay-rights activists have concluded since the election that
their aggressive push for same-sex marriage played into the hands of social
conservatives and Republicans and that such litigation should cease until
public opinion has become more receptive; the gay-rights agenda should
focus instead on securing reforms such as civil unions and partnership bene
fits. 304 An openly gay officeholder in California questioned "the strategic
wisdom of pushing forward an issue that draws vehement opposition from
nearly two-thirds of voters."305 One gay-rights activist observed that "[o]ur
legal strategy is at least 10 years ahead of our political and legislative strat
egy," and another warned that if same-sex marriage advocates won in court,
it would be "like pouring gasoline onto the fire for purposes of the federal

30 1 .
Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2004,
at A39; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting that social conservatives view the successful ballot
initiatives in 2004 "as a national mandate to move forward with more constitutional change, includ
ing another attempt at passing an amendment in Congress"); VandeHei & Fletcher, supra note 300
(quoting Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council, "I believe there is no more important issue
for the president's second term than the preservation of marriage").
302.

Knickerbocker, supra note 298.

303. Such challenges are already under way in the courts of several states. See, e.g., Kristen A.
Grahan, New Jersey Appeals Court Hears Same-Sex Marriage Case, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 8,
2004, at A20 (noting that an intermediate New Jersey appeals court heard argument in a recent case
seeking a right for gays and lesbians to marry); Thomas J. Lueck, State Justice Rules Against 13
Couples Seeking Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 1IMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at B4 (noting that in the last two
months two state trial judges in New York have rejected a right to same-sex marriage under the state
constitution).
This is not to say that courts will desist from expanding the rights of gays and lesbians in other
contexts where public opinion is more supportive. See infra notes 384-385 and accompanying text.
304.
John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2004, at A l (noting that leaders of the gay rights movement are embroiled in a bitter debate over
whether they should moderate their goals after the election losses, with some groups, such as the
Human Rights Campaign, the nation's largest gay and lesbian advocacy group, favoring less empha
sis on legalizing same-sex marriage); Knickerbocker, supra note 298 (noting Matt Foreman of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force stating that gay rights advocates had made a mistake by lob
bying lawmakers and filing lawsuits before building sufficient grassroots support); Liptak, supra
note 298 (noting Matthew Coles, Director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union, stating that winning too soon in court would mean losing in the court of pub
lic opinion and concluding that "we are unprepared for the consequences of winning"); Michelle
Mittelstadt, Election Day Defeat on Same-Sex Marriage Issue Sparks Debate, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 1 6, 2004, at I IA (noting that many gay and lesbian leaders concluded after the election
that they had pushed too hard, too fast for same-sex marriage).
305.
Susan P. Kennedy, Blinded by the Cause of Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2 1 ,
2004, at B5.
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marriage amendment."306 Democratic strategists are struggling to figure out a
way to neutralize an issue that seems sure to benefit Republicans in the short
1
term.30
C . Why Backlash ?
Court rulings such as Brown and Goodridge produce political back
lashes for three principal reasons: They raise the salience of an issue, they
incite anger over "outside interference" or "judicial activism," and they alter
the order in which social change would otherwise have occurred.
Brown was harder to ignore than earlier changes in southern racial prac
tices. Most white southerners did not see black jurors or black police
officers, who policed black neighborhoods only, and they would have been
largely unaware of the dramatic increases in black voter registration that had
occurred since World War II. Even some instances of integration-such as
on city buses or golf courses-would have gone unnoticed by many white
southerners.308 But they could not miss Brown, which received front-page
coverage in virtually every newspaper in the country and was a constant
topic of southern conversations.309 A northern white visitor found after
Brown that segregation "is the foremost preoccupation of the Southern
mind. . . . [It] intrudes into almost every conversation. It nags, it bothers and

306. Liptak, supra note 298 (reporting views of Matt Foreman of the National Gay and Les
bian Task Force and quoting Mathew Staver, president and general counsel of Liberty Council); see
also Tim Evans, Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Due, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 1 6, 2005, at B 1 (noting
that one of the couples serving as plaintiffs in a case challenging Indiana's ban on same-sex mar
riage is no longer certain that a victory is desirable, given that it might inspire a state constitutional
amendment overturning the result).
Other gay-rights activists strenuously disagree with the idea of temporarily relegating demands
for same-sex marriage to the backbumer. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Gay Rights Advocates Split
Over Taking Softer Course, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1 3, 2004, at A l (noting that supporters of Cheryl
Jacques, former head of the Human Rights Campaign, report that she was forced out of office be
cause she wanted to continue pushing for full marriage rights for gays and lesbians in spite of the
election results and that the organization's board of directors believed, to the contrary, that the lesson of
the election was that same-sex marriage was a losing issue at this time); Broder supra note 304 (noting
that Jonathan Katz, executive coordinator of the Larry Kramer Initiative for Lesbian and Gay Studies at
Yale University, rejected this sort of retrenchment as completely wrong and stated that achieving mar
riage rights was fundamental to winning equality for gays and lesbians); Evelyn Nieves, Gay
Activists Refuse to Bargain Away Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2004, at A2 (noting that dozens of
prominent advocates for gay rights sent a letter to every member of Congress criticizing a report that
the Human Rights Campaign was planning to moderate its position on same-sex marriage).
,

307. David D. Kirkpatrick & Katie Zezima, Supreme Court Tums Down a Same-Sex Mar
riage Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A20; see also Easton, supra note 293 (noting the
uncomfortable position that proposed constitutional bans on same-sex marriage create for Democ
ratic presidential prospects such as Mark Warner, the governor of Virginia, who would like to
neutralize cultural issues that have harmed Democrats in the South).
308. For examples, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1 9 1 5-1972, at 1 5 3 ( 1 995), and Miscellaneous, So. SCH. NEWS (Nash
ville), May 1958, at 5.
309. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Desegregation and Its Chances for Success: Northern and South
ern Views, 35 Soc. FORCES 339, 341 tbl.3 ( 1 957).
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3
it will not be ignored." 1 0 One white-supremacist leader credited the Court
with "awaken[ing] us from a slumber of about 30 years,"3 1 1 and an Alabama
public official noted that white southerners owed the Justices "a debt of
gratitude" for "caus[ing] us to become organized and unified."3 1 2
Lawrence and, to an even greater extent, Goodridge, have dramatically
raised the salience of gay-rights issues. Many other reforms on issues of
sexual orientation-such as repeal of criminal prohibitions on sodomy, ex
pansion of partnership benefits, and enactment of statutory protections
against discrimination in employment and public accommodations-have
occurred without riveting public attention. 3 1 3 Since Goodridge, though,
same-sex marriage has constantly captured front-page newspaper headlines,
and the issue received enormous attention during the 2004 presidential elec
tion campaign. 3 1 4 Court rulings such as Lawrence and Goodridge forced
people who previously had not paid much attention to gay-rights issues to
notice what has been happening and to form an opinion on it. As one social
conservative observed not long after the Massachusetts decision, "the more
people focus on [gay marriage], the less they support it."31 5 Another critic of
same-sex marriage noted that Goodridge "slapped American Christians in
their face and woke them up."3 16 In the spring of 2004 in Oregon, the Chris
tian Coalition sent out 75,000 voter guides opposing the reelection of Justice
Rives Kistler of the state supreme court, denouncing him as "the only open
homosexual supreme court judge in the nation"; it was the same-sex mar
7
riage issue that had given salience to the jurist's sexual orientation. 3 1
3 1 0 . Hamilton Basso, Letter to the Editor, To Understand the South, N.Y. nMES, Apr. 10,
1955, at E l O .
311.
banker) .

Councils ' Plan Told, So. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), Apr. 1955, at 3 (quoting a southern

3 1 2.
What They Say, So. SCH . NEWS (Nashville), Nov. 1959, at 16 (quoting Alabama Attorney
General MacDonald Gallion).
3 1 3. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 88 (noting a dramatic expansion in partnership benefits over
the last ten years).
3 1 4 . See, e.g., Dan Gilgoff, The Morals and Values Crowd, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
1 5, 2004, at 42 ("Gay marriage wasn't a national issue until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court effectively legalized it last November.").
3 1 5.
Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (quoting Rev. Lou Sheldon, chairman of the Traditional
Values Coalition) ; see also Lynn Vincent, Coun's Eye for the Married Guy, WORLD MAG., Dec. 6,
2003, available at http://www.worldmag .com/displayarticle.cfm?id=8333 (quoting a congressional
representative who supports a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, who
stated that until Goodridge, "[a] lot of people didn't realize the gravity of the situation . . . . Some
times it takes something like this to jolt people into action .").
3 16.
Vincent, supra note 3 1 5 ; see also Kaplan, supra note 202, at 33 (quoting Phil Burress,
president of Citizens for Community Values in Ohio, stating that "I'm beginning to think this was a
good thing for America, because it woke people up.").
3 1 7 . Breslau, supra note 240.
The Oregon Christian Coalition promised to challenge Kistler's fitness to serve on moral
grounds: "We'll give the people of Oregon information on who they want as a judge, a man who
believes family is as important as it has been for thousands of years or a man doing what in the past
has been against law and is against moral law." Charles E. Beggs, Gay Issue Will Arise in Court
Race, AP Newswires, Mar. 2 1 , 2004, available at http://www.kgw.com/news-local/stories/
kgw_0321 04_news_election_gayjudge_.aa280c6d.html. Kistler survived the challenge, but with
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The second reason that rulings such as Brown and Goodridge produce
political backlashes is that judicially mandated social reform may mobilize
greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures or with the
acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions. Brown repre
sented federal interference in southern race relations-something that white
southerners, harboring deep historical resentments over military rule and
"carpetbag" government during Reconstruction-could not easily tolerate.318
Some earlier changes in racial practices-such as the hiring of black police
officers or the desegregation of minor-league baseball teams-flowed from
choices made by white southerners rather than from judicial decrees. Other
changes-such as increases in public spending on black schools and the
growth of black voter registration-had been influenced by federal court
decisions, but they still depended on choices made by southern whites.
Brown was different; it left southern whites no choice but to desegregate
their schools. Accordingly, Brown was "viewed by many white Southerners
as federal intervention designed to destroy their way of life."3 19
Goodridge, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, cannot be
seen as outside interference-at least with regard to ramifications for Mas
sachusetts-in the same way that white southerners tended to regard the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown. However, because it was a court deci
sion, rather than a reform adopted by voters or popularly elected legislators,
critics were able to deride it as the handiwork of arrogant "activist judges"
defying the will of the people.32° Ken Starr, a former federal appeals court
judge, solicitor general, and independent counsel, called Goodridge "a terri
ble judicial usurpation of the power of the people through their elected
representatives to fashion social policy."321 Karl Rove declared that President
Bush believed that "5 ,000 years of human history should not be overthrown
by the acts of a few liberal judges."322 The president himself stated during
one of the presidential debates, "I' m deeply concerned that judges are
just sixty percent of the vote-in a state where appellate judges rarely face serious challenges for
reelection. 2004 Primary Election Results, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), May 20, 2004, at 2A.
3 1 8. Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that white southern
ers, "harbor[ing] in historical memory, with deep resentment, the program of reconstruction and the
deep humiliation of carpetbag government imposed by conquest," viscerally rejected outside inter
ference).
3 1 9. DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY Bus BOYCOTT 208 (Stewart Bums ed., 1997)
(quoting Bayard Rustin's report onhis visit to Montgomery during the bus boycott, March 2 1 , 1956).

320. See, e.g., Bumiller, supra note 225 (quoting President Bush defending a federal marriage
amendment as necessary because of "activist judges" redefining marriage); Lisa Schiffren, Op-Ed,
How the Judges Forced the President 's Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 1 3 (arguing that
"four Massachusetts judges, looking to bring about radical social change from the bench, decided
that their commonwealth must begin performing same-sex marriages" and that "[w]hether you favor
gay marriage or not, it should be a concern when judges . . . decide to circumvent the democratic
process on a core issue"); Seelye & Elder, supra note 97 (quoting Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, sponsor
of a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, criticizing "activist judges" and observing that
"if the definition of marriage is to be changed, it should be done by the American people, not four
judges in Massachusetts").
32 1 .

Seelye, supra note 2 1 3.

322.

Rove Says Marriage Amendment on Bush 's Agenda, supra note 300.
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making those decisions, and not the citizenry of the United States."323 Even a
prominent gay-rights activist such as Andrew Sullivan, former editor of the
New Republic, conceded that "[c]ourt-imposed mandates rub people the
wrong way, even those who support including gay couples within the family
structure."324 The Goodridge ruling on same-sex marriage contrasts with
other gay-rights reforms such as decriminalization of same-sex sodomy or
the expansion of antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation, where
legislatures have been the driving force.
Moreover, because the Full Faith & Credit Clause of the federal consti
tution conceivably-though doubtfully-would place other states under
some obligation to respect Massachusetts marriages, critics of Goodridge
were able to rally support for a federal constitutional amendment, which
was said to be necessary to protect the rest of the nation from the "activist
judges" of Massachusetts. 325 To be sure, in light of the well-recognized pub
lic policy exception to the Full Faith & Credit Clause and in light of the
Defense of Marriage Act passed by Congress in 1 996, Goodridge probably
would have no binding effect outside of Massachusetts even without such an
amendment.326 But the ability of critics of same-sex marriage to rally support
for a constitutional amendment depended less on the reality of the extraterri
torial impact of Goodridge than on its perceived consequences; moreover,
these critics were able to sow doubts as to what "activist judges" might do
with the Defense of Marriage Act. 327 Thus, two prominent conservative
scholars insisted that a federal marriage amendment was necessary to pre
vent "liberal state judges, abetted by sympathetic Justices on the Supreme
Court of the United States [from] foist[ing] same-sex marriage upon the
whole nation."328 Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi warned, "sadly, it is only
a matter of time before the Defense of Marriage Act is overturned by un-

323.
David von Drehle, Take the Issues to the People, Not
14, 2004, at B4.

to

the Couns, WASH. POST, Nov.

324. Id. ; see also Cloud, supra note 88 (quoting Glenn Stanton, spokesman for Focus on the
Family, stating that critics of Goodridge "don't know which to be more outraged at-the death of
marriage or the death of democracy").
325.
See, e.g., 1 50 CONG. REc. S791 l (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("an
obscure supreme court in Massachusetts . . . is deciding this issue for all of America"); Dao, supra
note 221 (noting a Georgia legislator emphasizing the need for a state constitutional amendment
forbidding same-sex marriage because of "activist judges").
326. See, e.g. , Rauch, supra note 1 5 1 (quoting some lawyers stating that the Full Faith &
Credit Clause has never been interpreted to require states to recognize marriages that contravene
their public policy and noting that this conservative Supreme Court is not about to overturn the
Defense of Marriage Act).
327.
E.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gives New Push to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2004, at A6 (noting Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council, warning, "If same-sex
couples 'marry' in Massachusetts and move to other states, the Defense of Marriage Act will be left
vulnerable to the same federal courts that have banned the Pledge of Allegiance and sanctioned
partial-birth abortion"); Bumiller, supra note 225 (quoting President Bush warning that the Defense
of Marriage Act might itself be struck down by "activist courts"); see also Schiffren, supra note 320
(warning that "[u]ndoubtedly, there are more judges across the country waiting for their chance to
be creative, too").
328.

George & Tubbs, supra note 147.
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elected Federal judges who 'find' rights in the U.S. Constitution which sim
ply are not there."329 The Republican party's platform in 2004 proclaimed
that "anything less than a Constitutional amendment, passed by the Con
gress and ratified by the states, is vulnerable to being overturned by activist
judges."330 Another conservative activist warned, "[w ]e are in a race between
the federal courts and the marriage amendment."33 1
Third and perhaps most important, court decisions produce backlashes
by commanding that social reform take place in a different order than might
otherwise have occurred. On subjects such as race and sexual orientation,
public attitudes often vary across a range of issues. Under Jim Crow, whites
were generally more opposed to interracial marriage and the integration of
grade schools than they were to desegregating transportation or permitting
blacks to vote.332 Similarly, heterosexuals today tend to be far more commit
ted to preventing same-sex marriage than to barring same-sex "civil unions"
or to permitting employers to discriminate based on sexual orientation.333
Heterosexuals are least determined to retain criminal prohibitions on private,
consensual, adult same-sex sodomy.334
By the early 1 950s, many southern cities had relaxed Jim Crow in public
transportation, police-department employment, athletic competitions, and
voter registration.335 Yet white southerners were more adamant about pre
serving grade-school segregation, which lay near the top of the white
supremacist hierarchy of preferences. Blacks, conversely, were often more
interested in voting, ending police brutality, securing decent jobs, and re
ceiving a fair share of public education funds than in desegregating grade
schools. These partially inverse hierarchies of preference among whites and
blacks opened space for political negotiation (to the extent that blacks had
the power to compel whites to bargain). Before Brown, many politicians in
the South had built successful careers by supporting populist economic poli
cies while quietly backing gradual racial reform.336 Brown made that
329.
1 50 CoNG. REC. S7923 (daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Lott); see also id. at
S7925 (statement of Sen. Brownback of Kansas) ("The choice is clear: Either we amend the Consti
tution and protect the rights of the people to self-determination in this process or the Constitution
will be amended, in effect, by the edict of judges.").
330. 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 26 1 ; see also 150 CONG. REC. S7908
(daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (warning that without a federal constitutional
amendment, "the States will be powerless to defend themselves against these runaway judges").
Republicans in the House passed a measure to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in cases deal
ing with the Defense of Marriage Act. H.R. 3 3 1 3, 1 08th Cong. (2004).
33 1 .

Kirkpatrick & Zezima, supra note 307.

332.
I GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 60-6 1 , 587-88 ( 1 944).
333.

See infra note 390 and accompanying text.

334.

See infra notes 340-345 and accompanying text.

335.

See KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 1 88-90.

336.
NUMAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM, SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RE
CONSTRUCTION 25, 33-37, 50 ( 1 975); EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACIAL SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 29-3 1 , 37-39, 4145 ( 1 976).
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approach untenable by forcing to the forefront an issue-racial segregation
of public schools-on which most white southerners were unwilling to com

promise. Brown thus virtually ensured a backlash among southern whites. 337
Had the Court first decided a case such as Gayle v. Browder,

338

which re

quired the desegregation of local bus transportation, the reaction of white
southerners would probably have been less vitriolic. Indeed, southern whites
had shown far greater restraint in response to earlier Court decisions invali
dating the white primary and striking down segregation in graduate and
339
c
l e ducation.
pro1ess10na
.
By contrast, Lawrence dealt with an issue on which heterosexuals are
.

most tolerant of change. Whatever most Americans today think of same-sex
marriage or gays openly serving in the military, few favor punishing the pri
40
vate sexual conduct of gays and lesbians. 3
As one leading social

conservative put it after Lawrence, "even most Christians believe that what
41
is done in the privacy of one's home is not the government's business." 3 In
1 96 1 all fifty states punished same-sex sodomy; in 1 986 only twenty-five

did so; and only thirteen states did so at the time of Lawrence (and only four
4
of these had statutes that were explicitly addressed to same-sex sodomy).3 2
43
3
Even in those holdout states, virtually no prosecutions actually occurred.
Thus, Lawrence was about as (politically) easy a constitutional case as the
Court ever confronts: The Justices were asked to translate into constitutional
44
law a social norm that commanded overwhelming popular support.3 Thus,

they probably anticipated a relatively placid response to their ruling, unlike
in Brown, where some of the Justices expected white southerners to respond
45
with violence and school closures. 3

Goodridge produced a political backlash for the same reason that Brown

did. By the early twenty-first century, most Americans were willing to ac

cept decriminalization of same-sex sodomy, statutory bans on employment
337.

See KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 391-92 (citing relevant sources).

338.

352 U.S. 903 (1 956) (per curiam), ajj'g 142 F. Supp . 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).

339.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 238-39, 254-55, 393.

340.
See, e.g., 1 50 CONG. REc. S79 1 2 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I
believe gay people ought to be able to do whatever they believe they should in the privacy of their
own homes, but I don't think they should have the right to redefine traditional marriage.").
34 1 .

Rosen, supra note 200, at 5 0 (quoting Paul M . Weyrich) .

342.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).

Id. ; see also Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader Rights,
343.
N.Y. nMES, June 27, 2003, at A20 (noting that in Harris County, Texas, Lawrence was the only
person prosecuted for same-sex sodomy in at least twenty-two years).
344.
Robin Finn, After Battling for Gay Rights, Time to Shift Energies, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2003, at B2 (quoting Ruth E. Harlow, former legal director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Edu
cation Fund, observing that in Lawrence "the majority of the court caught up with the vast majority
of Americans"); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 556 (observing that "[i]f the Court was look
ing for a case in which to flex its political muscles with impunity, it could hardly have found a better
candidate"); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 27 (describing Lawrence as "judicial invalidation of a law
that had become hopelessly out of touch with existing social convictions"); Thomas, supra note 2, at
40 (noting that the Court in Lawrence was ·�ust catching up to public opinion").
345.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 294.
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discrimination based on sexual orientation, and perhaps even civil unions for
3
same-sex couples. 46 Before Lawrence and, even more so, Goodridge gave
same-sex marriage special prominence, many Democratic politicians
including most of those competing for the party's presidential nomination in
2004--supported civil unions, but not formal marriage, for gays and lesbi
3
ans. 47 This compromise position was an effort to appeal to homosexual
voters, who disproportionately support the Democratic party, without alien
ating those heterosexuals who are willing to countenance progressive
change on issues involving sexual orientation but not same-sex marriage.348
After Goodridge, that compromise position became untenable. With gay
and lesbian couples demanding marriage licenses across the country, it be
came harder to divert public attention from same-sex marriage to civil
unions. Democratic politicians such as Senator Kerry continued to empha
size their opposition to same-sex marriage, but voters found their nuanced
position-opposing same-sex marriage but also opposing a federal constitu
tional amendment to ban it-less palatable than the straightforward
condemnation of same-sex marriage provided by most Republicans.349 Com
pounding his problems, Kerry's vote against the federal Defense of
Marriage Act in 1996 made his professed opposition to same-sex marriage
less credible than President Bush's.350
One reason Democrats had difficulty finessing the issue is that those
voters opposed to same-sex marriage tend to be more passionate than those
who support it or those who profess neutrality. (This was also true with re
gard to attitudes toward public school desegregation in the 1950s; southern
whites were far more adamantly opposed to the change than northern whites
3
were to supporting it. 51 ) For example, in Ohio, the drop-off in voting be
tween the presidential race and the ballot initiative on marriage was six
percent in heavily Democratic areas but only 1 .5 percent in socially
346.
NAT'L Pus. RADIO, supra note 97, fig. 1 4 (noting that at the end of 2003, Americans
opposed civil unions by only forty-nine percent to forty-two percent); Gallup Poll, May 5-7, 2003,
Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of Connecticut, accession # 0429847, avail
able at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (noting that Americans by sixty-two percent to
thirty-five percent favor the same legal rights to health care benefits and Social Security survivor
benefits for same-sex couples as for married couples).
347.
See, e.g. , NAT'L Pus. RADIO, supra note 97 (noting in December 2003 that Democratic
voters favored civil unions by fifty-five percent to forty percent while Republicans opposed them by
sixty-three percent to twenty-seven percent); Belluck, supra note 327 (noting that many Massachu
setts legislators "had supported civil unions but not gay marriage and were hoping the court would
not force them to make an all-or-nothing decision"); Morning Edition, supra note 222 (noting that
major Democratic candidates for president opposed gay marriage but supported civil unions).
348.
See Vincent, supra note 3 1 5 (noting that "Democratic presidential hopefuls . . . are trying
to preserve their political liberal base by expressing support for Goodrich [sic] while straining not to
alienate centrists in the general electorate with a wholesale endorsement of what remains a radical
notion").
349.

Bigotry and Ballots, supra note 273; Greenberger, supra note 238.

350.
1 50 CONG. REc. S791 l (daily ed. July 1 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (quoting
Senator Kerry in September 1996 stating that the Defense of Marriage Act "does violence to the
spirit and letter of the Constitution").
35 1 .

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 365-66.
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conservative Shelby County, which voted more heavily for Bush than any
other county in the state. 352 A report by the Pew Research Center in February
2004 found that among the third of Americans supporting same-sex mar
riage, only six percent would refuse to vote for a candidate who opposed
that reform. But among the two-thirds of Americans who oppose same-sex
marriage, thirty-four percent would refuse to support a political candidate
who did not share their view; that number increased to fifty-five percent
among evangelical Christians. 353 Further, it is striking that eight of the eleven
state ballot initiatives that passed on November 2, 2004 rejected civil unions
as well as same-sex marriage, despite election-day exit polls revealing that
sixty-two percent of Americans support either marriage or civil unions for
same-sex couples. This result suggests that voters were much more intensely
opposed to same-sex marriage than they were supportive of civil unions.354
Decisions such as Brown and Goodridge not only mandate changes in
the abstract, but they inspire activists to take concrete steps to implement
them, thus further inciting political backlash. After the decisions in both
Brown I and Brown II, the NAACP urged southern blacks to petition school
boards for immediate desegregation on threat of litigation.355 Blacks filed
such petitions in hundreds of southern localities, including in the Deep
South. In a few cities, such as Baton Rouge and Montgomery, blacks even
showed up in person to try to register their children at white schools.356 In
the mid- 1950s, but for Brown, such challenges would have been inconceiv
able in the Deep South, where race relations had been least affected by
broad forces for racial change. One might have predicted that a campaign
for racial reform there would have begun with voting rights or the equaliza
tion of black schools, not with school desegregation, which was hardly the
top priority of most blacks and was more likely to incite violent white resis
tance. Merely si,gning one's name to a school desegregation petition was an
act of courage for blacks in the Deep South, and it frequently incited eco
nomic reprisals and occasionally physical violence.357 The petition campaign
contributed significantly to the rise of massive resistance in the mid- 1950s;
black efforts to implement Brown stimulated more resistance than did the

352.

Dao, supra note 267.

Kaplan, supra note 202; see also Breslau, supra note 240, at 43 (quoting the spokesman
353.
for the Defense of Marriage Coalition, Tim Nashif, "(p]eople are three times more passionate on this
issue than they were even about abortion," and noting that the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
admits that voters opposed to same-sex marriage are four times more likely to vote according to a
candidate's position on the issue than are those who favor it or who profess neutrality).
354.
Cf Thomas Oliphant, Op-Ed, The Gay Ma"iage Deception, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7,
2004, at D 1 1 (noting the paradox that even though exit polls showed that sixty percent of the public
supports either same-sex marriage or civil unions, eight of the state marriage initiatives that passed
barred legal recognition of either relationship and attributing this disconnect to deception in the way
that advocates presented the amendments).
355.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 368.

356.

Id.

357.

Id. at 368-69.
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decision itself. 358 As the Daily News of Jackson, Mississippi, editorialized,
"there is only one way to meet the attack of the NAACP. Organized aggres
sion must be met by organized resistance."359
Goodridge had a similar effect. Inspired by the ruling of the Massachu
setts court, thousands of same-sex couples applied for and received marriage
licenses in San Francisco and in Multnomah County, Oregon, and smaller
numbers did so in several other cities across the nation.360 Office-holders in
local communities where public opinion supported same-sex marriage had
obvious incentives to grant such licenses; their defiance of higher authority
converted them into local heroes361 (much as southern governors such as
Orval Faubus and George Wallace became virtually unbeatable politically
36
by defying federal-court integration orders after Brown 2). For example,
Mayor Newsom, who had won a narrow victory in the San Francisco may
oral election in December 2003, saw his approval ratings rise to a staggering
eighty-five percent after he ordered local officials to begin issuing marriage
licenses in February 2004.363 As the threat that same-sex marriage would
expand beyond the boundaries of Massachusetts became real, opponents
mobilized behind state and federal constitutional amendments to limit mar
riage to unions between men and women.364
358.

Id.

359.

Report of the Secretary for the Months of July and August 1 955, at 5 (Sept. 1 2, 1955),

microformed on Papers of the NAACP, supp. to pt. I, reel 2, frame 786 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.).
360.

See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.

36 1 .
See, e.g., Crampton, supra note 23 1 (reporting that Mayor West of New Paltz, who began
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, addressed rallies, gave speeches reminiscent of the
civil rights movement of the 1 960s, and declared himself willing to go to jail for the cause); cf Dean
Murphy, California Court Rules Gay Unions Have No Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1 3, 2004, at A l
(noting the mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom, defending his decision to grant marriage li
censes to same-sex couples as "right and appropriate" even after the California Supreme Court had
slapped him down and declared the licenses to be "void and of no legal effect").
362.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 398, 405-06.

Rachel Gordon, Newsom Sheds Wonk Image-Takes it to the Streets, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
363.
22, 2004, at A l .
Newsom won the election with just fifty-three percent of the vote against a candidate of the
Green Party, Matt Gonzales, who outflanked Newsom on the left. Id. In his concession speech,
Gonzales warned, "When Mayor Newsom is wrong, we'll be there to oppose him." John Wilder
muth, S.F. leftists Warily Ask if Newsom Is for Real, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2004, at A l . After
Newsom issued his marriage order, a spokesman of the Green Party declared, "Gavin Newsom's
stand on gay marriage made us all proud," and a local Democratic pollster said, "Newsom has
earned the respect of many progressives and liberals." Id. Newsom also quickly became one of
America's best-known mayors, appearing on national television programs such as Good Morning
America, Larry King Live, and Nightline, and Newsweek magazine named him one of America's top
ten Democrats. Ilene Lelchuk, Newsom, Unbowed by Decision, Says He is 'More Resolved', S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 1 3, 2004, at A l 5 . By the summer of 2004, his local approval ratings had shot up to
eighty-five percent. Id.
364.
Bob Egelko, S.F. Gay Marriages Head to Court, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2 1 , 2004, at A l
(noting that the "highly visible City Hall weddings, and San Francisco's libertine reputation, helped
to fuel the successful campaigns for anti-gay-marriage amendments in 1 1 states last month, includ
ing Ohio, where turnout for the ballot measure may have tipped the crucial state to Bush");
Greenberger, supra note 238 (noting that conservative activists and some Democrats are pointing to
the Massachusetts supreme court decision, together with the images of gay weddings in San Fran
cisco, as a key reason for Kerry's Joss).
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After the 2004 election, many prominent Democrats blamed Mayor
Newsom of San Francisco for providing conservatives with an issue to rally
around.365 Senator Dianne Feinstein of California observed that the thou
sands of same-sex weddings in San Francisco "energize[d] a very
conservative vote" and that the "whole issue has been too much, too fast, too
soon. And people aren't ready for it."366 Representative Barney Frank of
Massachusetts, one of the few openly gay representatives in the U.S. Con
gress, said that Newsom had "helped to galvanize Mr. Bush's conservative
supporters in those states by playing into people's fears of same-sex wed
dings."367 A lawyer for the Alliance Defense Fund, a Christian group that
sued to block the same-sex marriages in California, concurred with these
assessments, calling the court decisions the "triggers" but noting that Mayor
Newsom had "definitely accelerated the reaction" by providing imajes of
gay and lesbian couples embracing and celebrating their marriages. 36 Karl
Rove had to a stifle a grin when asked after the election whether he was in
debted to Mayor Newsom for opening City Hall to same-sex marriages.369
Thus, the most significant short-term consequence of Goodridge, as
with Brown, may have been the political backlash that it inspired. 370 By out
pacing public opinion on issues of social reform, such rulings mobilize
opponents, undercut moderates, and retard the cause they purport to ad
vance. And while the violent southern backlash produced by Brown
generated a counterbacklash in northern opinion, in the wake of Goodridge
gays and lesbians have not faced the sort of pervasive public violence that
outrages moderates and turns the tide of public opinion once and for all.37 1

365.
See, e.g. , Pam B elluck, Maybe Same-Sex Marriage Didn 't Make the Difference, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at 05; Mehren, supra note 268; Mittelstadt, supra note 304; see also Blame it
on San Francisco?, S.F. CttRON., Nov, 8, 2004, at B6 (reluctantly conceding some validity to the
theory that the seeds of President Bush's victory were planted in San Francisco in February, as the
scenes of thousands of gay couples marrying "caused more of a jolt to heartland sensibilities than
many folks here realized at the time").
366.

Belluck, supra note 365.

367.
Dean E. Murphy, Some Democrats Blame One of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004,
at A l 2; see also Wheatley, supra note 277 (noting that those, like the author, who had succumbed
earlier in the year "to a giddy and gleeful inflation of pride" when gay couples lined up in San Fran
cisco to get married, must now face the "harsh reality" that they had "grossly miscalculated" and
that their "gambit for marriage was a resounding failure").
368.
Murphy, supra note 367; see also Anthony B. Robinson, Making Sense of Moral Sur
prise During the 2004 Election, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 2004, at F l (calling
Mayor Newsom "the Republicans' secret weapon in 2004").
369.
at A20.

Adam Nagoumey, Moral Values Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004,

370.
See Rosen, Immodest Proposal, supra note 4 1 , at 1 9 ("By trying to impose gay marriage
by judicial fiat, the Massachusetts court may set back the cause of gay and lesbian equality rather
than advance it."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Gay Marriage Isn 't an Issue for the Courts to Decide, NAT ' L J.,
Nov. 22, 2003, at 3557 ('The backlash [Goodridge] has provoked could conceivably prove powerful
enough to set back the gay-rights movement for decades.").
371.
But cf Meet the Press: Arnold Schwarzenegger (NBC television broadcast Feb. 22, 2004)
(Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger reporting on "riots" in San Francisco over same-sex marriage
and predicting, "The next thing we know . . . there are injured or there are dead people").

December 2005]

Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge)
V.

483

TH E FUTURE

Alexander Bickel, the preeminent constitutional law scholar of the
1960s, once described the Warren Court's landmark rulings as predictions of
the future. 372 Other scholars have likewise depicted path-breaking Court de
cisions such as Roe v. Wade373 and Furman v. Georgia374 as efforts by the
Justices to put the Court on the right side of history. 375 Other commentators
have objected that even if such descriptions are accurate, to defend such a
soothsaying role for the Court is normatively problematic. 376
Brown and Lawrence share a characteristic pertaining to this debate: On
both the issues of racial equality and gay rights, public opinion was in
tensely divided at the time of the Court's ruling, but future trends were not
difficult to predict. In the Justices' conference deliberations on Brown,
Stanley Reed predicted that racial segregation would disappear in the border
states within fifteen or twenty years, even without judicial intervention. 377
Justice Jackson similarly observed that "segregation is nearing an end."378
Given the propensity of constitutional law to suppress outliers, 379 such a shift
in social practices might have guaranteed an eventual judicial ruling against
segregation. A subsequent generation of Justices, finding segregation even
more abhorrent than their predecessors had, would have been sorely tempted
to apply an ascendant national norm against segregation to shrinking num
bers of holdout states. This is probably what Justice Jackson had in mind

372.
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 1 2- 1 3 ( 1 970)
(noting that the Warren Court "bet on the future" and "relied on events for vindication"); see also id.
at 99 ("the Justices of the Warren Court placed their own bet on the future"); id. at 1 7 3-74 (noting
the Warren Court's "confident reliance on the intuitive judicial capacity to identify the course of
progress").
373.

410 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973).

374.

408 U.S. 238 ( 1972).

Furman, 408 U.S. at 3 1 3 (White, J., concurring) (observing that the death penalty "has
375.
for all practical purposes run its course"); JOHN c. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
4 1 3-14 (1 994) (noting that the Justices in Furman thought that capital punishment was on the way
out and that they were offering a "nudge" toward extinction); see also id. at 352 (portraying Roe v.
Wade as an effort by Supreme Court Justices "to anticipate popular sentiment" and as a product of
their "vision of the future and . . . [their] confidence in their own foresight"); THE SUPREME COURT
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 6 1 7 (reproducing the conference notes in Furman v. Georgia,
with Justice Brennan noting that support for abolition of the death penalty has increased throughout
the twentieth century and Justice Stewart predicting that "[s]omeday the Court will hold that the
death sentence is unconstitutional").
376.
JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69-70 ( 1980) (noting that "there is no
reason to suppose that judges are well qualified to foresee the future development of popular opin
ion," that the enterprise of predicting the future "is antidemocratic on its face," and that "by
predicting the future the Justices will unavoidably help shape it").
377.
William 0. Douglas, Conference Notes, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., (Dec. 1 3 , 1 952) (on file
with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Douglas Papers, Box 1 1 50).
378.

Id.

379.
See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PvBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 84-85,
1 88 ( 1 989); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 489-94 (2000);
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 ,
1 6- 1 7 ( 1 996).
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when he declared in his draft concurring opinion in Brown that "[w ]hatever
we might say today, within a generation [racial segregation] will be out
lawed by decision of this Court."380
The future may be even easier to predict with regard to gay rights. Al
though the election results in 2004 confirm that most Americans are not yet
ready for same-sex marriage, on other gay-rights issues the trend is plainly
in the direction of expanded rights. In 2004, voters in Cincinnati overturned
a city ordinance adopted ten years earlier that had barred the city council
from �assing any laws giving "minority or protected status" to gays and les
bians. 8 1 In both North Carolina and Idaho, states not normally considered
strong bastions of gay rights, voters elected their first openly gay state legis
lators, and voters in Dallas County, Texas elected as sheriff an openly
lesbian Democrat-the first woman ever to hold the post and the first De
mocrat to do so in nearly three decades.382 On January 1 , 2005, the nation's
most far-reaching domestic partnership law went into effect in California,
granting nearly all the rights of married couples to thousands of same-sex
partners.383 Moreover, despite election results revealing powerful public op
position to same-sex marriage, lower courts--even in socially conservative
states-have continued to expand gay rights in other contexts. In December
2004, a state court in Arkansas invalidated a regulation banning gays and
lesbians from serving as foster parents, 384 and the Montana Supreme Court
ruled that public universities in the state were constitutionally obliged to
provide gay employees with insurance coverage for domestic partners. 385
The demographics of public opinion on issues of sexual orientation vir
tually ensure that one day in the not-too-distant future a substantial majority
of Americans will support same-sex marriage386: young people are much

380.

Robert H. Jackson, Draft Memorandum, supra note 29, at I .

Christopher Lisotta, Six Reasons Why November 2 Wasn't a Total Gay Political Night381.
mare, L.A. WKLY., Dec. 24, 2004, atA20.
382.

Lisotta, supra note 38 1 .

383.

Egelko, supra note 364.

384. Judgment at I , Memorandum Opinion at 18, Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review
Bd., No. CV 1 999-9881 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004). The court invalidated the regulation under the
Equal Protection Clause, while denying that gays constituted a suspect class.
385.
Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004). The basis of the decision was
that Montana discriminated against same-sex couples by allowing only opposite-sex couples to
qualify through common-law marriage for partnership benefits. Id. at 452. The court went out of its
way to deny that it was calling into question the state's limitation of marriage to unions between a
man and a woman. Id. at 452-53.
386.
Canada 's Celebration of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 9, 2003, at A24 (noting that the
movement toward accepting same-sex marriage in the United States "will be unstoppable in time,
whatever the pace proves to be"); Frank Rich, And Now, the Queer Eye for the Straight Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at B I (noting the University of Chicago historian George Chauncy con
fidently predicting "the steady decline in opposition to same-sex marriage"); Right-to-Marry Battle
Continues, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2 1 , 2004, at B8 ("There is no question that the concept of same-sex
marriage is gaining acceptance, despite the success of resolutions against it in 1 1 states last Novem
ber."); Rosen, supra note 200, at 50 (noting that "two-thirds of Americans now say they believe that
same-sex marriage will be legal within the next hundred years").
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more likely to support gay rights than are their elders.387 Indeed, a poll taken
in June 2003 showed that sixty-one percent of respondents aged eighteen to
twenty-nine already supported the legalization of same-sex marriage, while
among those aged 65 and over just twenty-two percent did so.388 There is
little reason to believe that as people get older, their attitudes on such issues
become more conservative (unlike attitudes toward wealth redistribution,
which do become more conservative as people age and acquire more prop
erty). As an older generation holding more traditional views about sexual
orientation fades from the scene and today's youth become tomorrow's poli
cymakers, same-sex marriage will become increasingly accepted.389
Indeed, exit polls conducted in the 2004 election revealed that about
sixty percent of Americans already support either marriage or civil unions
for same-sex couples, and President Bush clarified just before the election
90
that he did not oppose states recognizing civil unions.3 The shift in public
opinion on this issue within just a few years has been truly astonishing,391
and it may suggest that the growing power and pervasiveness of popular
culture is likely to cause public attitudes on sexual orientation to shift faster
than racial and gender attitudes changed in preceding generations.392 At
some point, the Court is likely to constitutionalize a newly emerging con
sensus and invalidate bans on same-sex marriage, much as the Justices

387.

Sullivan, supra note 273, at 1 1 .

388. Linda Lyons, U.S. Next Down the Aisle Toward Gay Marriage?, GALLUP Pon TuESDAY
BRIEFING, July 22, 2003.
389.
Evans, supra note 306 (quoting Evan Wolfson, executive director of the Freedom to
Marry Project: "No civil rights movement advances without ups and downs and some difficult
patches. What is most important is that young people, regardless of their political affiliation, over
whelmingly support ending this discrimination."); Robin Toner, The Culture Wars, Part //, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, § 4, at 1 (quoting Democratic pollster Anna Greenberg observing, "it's really
likely in 10 or 20 years that people won't understand what all the fuss was about" and "[t)here's a
whole generation of people growing up who just don't think about these issues in the same way").
390. Gary Langer, A Question of Values, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at 19; Sullivan, supra note
273; Zemike, supra note 264; see also Steve Chapman, Our No. I Moral Value ls Still 'Live and Let
Live ', BALT. S UN , Nov. 9, 2004, at ISA (noting a Washington Post-ABC poll in 2004 finding that
fifty-four percent of respondents supported civil unions while only forty-two percent opposed them).
39 1 .
Chapman, supra note 390 (noting that today a majority support civil unions, which a
couple of years ago were "a radical concept"); Michael Kinsley, A Gay Marriage Success Story,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1 2, 2004, at MS (noting the extraordinary rapidity with which same-sex marriage
has gone from being a novel idea to being seriously debated); Kirkpatrick & Zezima, supra note 307
(reporting a statement by Cheryl Jacques of the Human Rights Campaign noting that a few years
ago people were scared to death of civil unions, whereas now that policy represents the political safe
ground); Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A l S (noting that "civil unions, which
stirred shock and fury in Vermont only a few years ago, have almost reached the stage of being
mainstream"); Sullivan, supra note 273; see also Lyons, supra note 388 (noting that when Gallup
first asked the question whether Americans supported same-sex marriage in 1 996, only twenty
seven percent answered yes, but by 2003 that number had increased to thirty-nine percent); Eliza
beth Mehren, Voters Oust 5 Who Backed Civil Union Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A23
(noting a clear backlash against civil unions in Vermont in the 2000 elections, with five incumbent
Republicans who had supported civil-union legislation being defeated in primary elections by social
conservatives).
Kinsley, supra note 39 1 ; see also Sunstein, supra note S2, at 29 (noting that dramatic shifts
392.
in attitudes regarding sexual orientation have been taking place "in an extraordinarily short time").
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struck down restnctions on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia
9
( 1967)3 3 after the civil rights movement had rendered anachronistic that last
9
formal vestige of Jim Crow.3 4
To be sure, predicting the future can be fraught with peril. When the Su
preme Court invalidated abortion restrictions in Roe v. Wade and cast doubt
upon the constitutionality of the death penalty in Funnan v. Georgia, the
Justices were probably imagining a future in which public opinion would
have continued to move in the same direction that the Court was pushing.395
Suffice it to say that on both occasions the Justices' prediction proved mis
taken. Over the next three decades, public opinion on abortion changed very
little from what it had been in 1973.396 Public o�inion on the death penalty
9
shifted quickly and powerfully against the Court. 7
Still, some predictions seem safer than others. The age disparities re
vealed by public opinion polls on issues of sexual orientation are so
dramatic that only an unforeseeable event of enormous magnitude could
disrupt the movement toward greater tolerance. Even some conservatives
who oppose same-sex marriage admit, when pressed, that they regard it as
probably inevitable.398 As Cheryl Jacques, then head of the Human Rights
Campaign, noted after the 2004 elections, "[ w ]e lost a battle, but we are
. . the war.,,399
wmnmg

393.

388 U.S. 1 ( 1 967).

394.
Cf Bigotry and Ballots, supra note 273 (noting that the same-sex marriage issue helped
reelect President Bush but taking solace in the fact that bans on interracial marriage were supported
until recently); see also Lelchuk, supra note 363 (noting Mayor Newsom of San Francisco predict
ing, immediately after the California supreme court voided the same-sex marriages he had earlier
authorized, that eventually San Francisco's stand would prevail, much as civil rights activists ulti
mately succeeded at ending bans on interracial marriage).
395.

See supra note 375.

396. Gallup Poll, Mar. 8-18, 1 974, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center, University of
Connecticut, accession # 0045804, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (reporting
that forty-seven percent of Americans supported Roe v. Wade and forty-four percent opposed it);
Gallup Poll, Mar. 26-28, 200 1 , The Roper Center, University of Connecticut, Public Opinion
Online, accession # 0380244, available at Westlaw, Public Opinion Online Database (reporting that
forty-seven percent of Americans consider themselves pro-choice, as opposed to forty-one percent
who consider themselves pro-life).
397.
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002) (noting that
the "decision of Furman . . . touched off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the
nation had ever seen"); JEFFRIES, supra note 375, at 414 (reporting Gallup polls and concluding that
the increase in public support for the death penalty after Furman was "so sharp that it seems almost
certain to have been a negative reaction to the Court's decision"); Carole S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capi
tal Punishment, 1 09 HARV. L. REV. 355, 4 1 1 - 1 2 (1995) ("[I]t seems fair to say that Furman
galvanized political opposition to abolition . . . .").
398. E.g., Lyons, supra note 388 (quoting Michael J. McManus, founder of Marriage Savers,
who said, when asked if same-sex marriage was inevitable, "My answer, alas, is probably.").
399.
Greenberger, supra note 238; see also Blame it on San Francisco ?, supra note 365 (con
tending that even though the same-sex marriage issue may have helped President Bush win
reelection, "[t]ime is on the side of the bold leaders who are willing to confront discrimination
[against gays] in clear and compelling terms").
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LEGITIMACY

Supreme Court Justices sometimes claim that the Court's legitimacy de
rives from its ability to demonstrate that its rulings are based on sound legal
principles rather than political calculations or personal preferences. In reaf
firming the Court's landmark abortion-rights decision, Roe v. Wade, the
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Case/00 declared that "[t]he underlying substance of [the Court's] legiti
macy is of course the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution
and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws."401 Fur
ther, the plurality stated, "[A] decision without principled justification
would be no judicial act at all,"402 and "[t]he Court must take care to speak
and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the
Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises
with social and political pressures. . . ."403
In the 1950s, critics assailed Brown v. Board of Education as unprinci
pled judicial activism. Southern whites charged the Court with ignoring
precedent, transgressing original intent, indulging in sociology, infringing
on the reserved rights of states, and usurping legislative authority.404 One
prominent newspaper editor in the South, James J. Kilpatrick, stated a typi
cal view: "In May of 1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors
known as the United States Supreme Court chose to throw away the estab
lished law. These nine men repudiated the Constitution, sp[a]t upon the
tenth amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their
own gauzy concepts of sociology."405
White southerners who sympathized with racial segregation were not the
only critics of Brown. Some eminent jurists and law professors who con
demned white supremacy also attacked the Court's reasoning. In 1958 Judge
Learned Hand stated, "I have never been able to understand on what basis
[Brown] does or can rest except as a coup de main,"406 and the following
year Professor Herbert Wechsler castigated the Court for failing to justify its
decision in Brown on the basis of any "neutral principle."407 Indeed, several
of the Justices themselves seemed unconvinced that Brown rested on a
sound legal basis. Justice Jackson, for example, conceded that he could not

400.

505 U.S. 833 ( 1 992) (plurality opinion).

40 1 .

Id. at 865.

402.

Id.

403.

Id.

404.

KLARMAN, supra note 1 1 , at 367-68 (citing relevant sources).

405.

Court Order Gets Varied Reaction from Region 's Newspapers, So. SCH. NEws (Nashville),

June 8, 1955, at 8, 9.

406.

LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 ( J 958).

407.

WECHSLER, supra note 54, at 32-34.
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"justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act," but he agreed to "go
,
along with it" as "a political decision.' 408
In the fifty years since it was decided, Brown has become an American
icon. Almost everyone regards the decision as right.409 No constitutional the
ory is taken seriously unless it can accommodate the result in Brown.410
Aspiring jurists who dared to question the soundness of Brown could not
possibly survive Senate confirmation hearings.4 11 In 1 987, Judge Robert
Bork criticized the Court's sexual-privacy decision, Griswold v. Connecti
412
413
cut, and its landmark reapportionment ruling, Reynolds v. Sims, but he
414
emphasized his support for Brown. This seismic shift in Brown's status
from a much-criticized ruling that divided public opinion to a sacrosanct
decision that is well-nigh universally applauded-may suggest that the
Court's legitimacy flows less from the soundness of its legal reasoning than
from its ability to predict future trends in public opinion.4 15
La,wrence v. Texas may one day have a similar history. Contemporary
critics of that decision have accused the Justices of engaging in unprincipled
activism, ignoring federalism and history, and inventing constitutional rights
6
that have no foundation in the traditional sources of constitutional law.4 1
408. Harold H. B urton, Conference Notes, Segregation Cases (Dec. 13, 1952) (on file with
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Burton Papers, Box 244).
409. See, e.g. , JEFFRIES, supra note 375, at 330 (stating that Brown "is universally approved as
both right and necessary[;] [m]ore powerful than any academic theory of constitutional interpreta
tion is the legend of Brown").
4 1 0.
See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 77 ( 1 990) (stating that "any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychologi
cal fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown"); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947, 952 ( 1 995) (noting that any
theory unable to accommodate Brown "is seriously discredited").
4 1 1 . See, e.g., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be
Chief Justice of the United States, S. EXEC. REP. No. 1 1 8, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25-26 ( 1 986)
(reproducing a 1971 letter from William Rehnquist to Senator James Eastland denying that views
hostile to the result in Brown expressed in a memorandum he authored as law clerk to Justice Jack
son during the 1 952 term were his own, and stating, "I . . . unequivocally . . . support the legal
reasoning and the rightness from the standpoint of fundamental fairness of the Brown decision").
4 1 2. Nomination ofRohen H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Coun of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l OOth Cong. 1 1 6 ( 1987) ("[T]he right
of privacy, as defined or undefined by Justice Douglas, was a free-floating right that was not derived
in a principled fashion from constitutional materials.").
413. Id. at 1 57 ("There is nothing in our constitutional history that suggests one man, one vote
is the only proper way of apportioning. . . . [l]t does not come out of anything in the Constitution
. . . .")
414. Id. at 104 ("Brown, delivered with the authority of a unanimous Court, was clearly cor
rect and represents perhaps the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law.").
415.
Cf Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1 28 1 , 1 3 1 6 ( 1976) (observing that "the power of judicial action to generate assent over the long haul
[is] the ultimate touchstone[] of legitimacy").
4 1 6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for the "invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' " and for subverting the democ
ratic process); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 44, at 1 557, 1 575 (condemning Lawrence as "a
paragon of the most anti constitutional branch of constitutional law: substantive due process," which
"displays a dismissive contempt for both the Constitution and the work of prior Courts" and "simply
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Lawrence's critics sound many of the same notes that Brown's critics did

fifty years earlier. Yet, as we have seen, the demographics of public opinion
on sexual-orientation issues suggest dramatic changes in the near future.
Those changes have already been sufficient to lead a majority of Justices to
discard Bowers v. Hardwick.411 It may not be too much longer before Bowers
comes to resemble Plessy v. Fe rguson41 8--one of the most vilified decisions
in the Court's history-and Lawrence evolves into the Brown of the twenty
first century. Then, the Court's legitimacy will have been even further en
hanced by virtue of the Justices having rightly predicted the future on
another great issue of social reform.

abandons legal analysis"); Dean E. Murphy, Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign for Broader
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A20 (quoting Virginia Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore
criticizing Lawrence for undermining the state's "right to pass legislation that reflects the views and
values of our citizens").
4 1 7.

478 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 986).

4 1 8.

1 63 U.S. 537 ( 1 896).
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